The 'ought's of use: contextualist considerations for normativists by Nettel, E.P.
1The 'Ought's Of Use: Contextualist
Considerations for Normativists
Edward Philip Nettel
UCL
MPhil Stud
2I, Edward Philip Nettel, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own.Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has beenindicated in the thesis.
3Abstract
The thesis argues that considerations that concern contextualists in the philosophyof language can allow for a conception of language use in which meaning is to beproperly regarded as intrinsically normative. I first introduce the idea that meaningis intrinsically normative and set out just what kind of features the posited normswould have to have. I then introduce an initial problem that exploits anincompatibility between the idea that the requirements laid down by the norms ofmeaning are to be understood in terms of hypothetical imperatives and meaningbeing intrinsically normative. I then discuss a reason for thinking that semanticcorrectness is an instrumental value, but contend that this is consistent withmeaning being intrinsically normative, and present a framework in which semanticcorrectness can be so thought of. This framework conceives of language use as apractice. I go on to look to arguments by Daniel Whiting in favour of the NormativityThesis, but find his presentation unable to answer the incompatibility argument.The reason for that is that Whiting accepts the idea that meaningful expressionsmust have conditions for correct application. I propose that there is space for anotion of conditions for semantic correctness that should not be understood interms of correct application. Finally, I discuss some traditional semanticcontextualist concerns, and show that interpreting them in a specific way, following,to various degrees of success, insights by P. F. Strawson and J. L. Austin (and, in turnCharles Travis) such a conception of semantic correctness, in contrast to theunderstanding of it in terms of the correct application of terms, is understood asderivative of the rules governing the practice of language use as understood inChapter 1. Such an understanding, I argue, is one in which meaning is intrinsically
4normative.
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8Introduction
This thesis began life as a project on the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. As it hascome out, there is now but one explicit reference to his work, and only a few otherintroductory remarks on Kripke's idiosyncratic reading of a few passages in the
Philosophical Investigations. Instead, it is now an essay that concerns a currentdebate that took root as a result of the work of the later Wittgenstein, and so, Isuppose, in that respect at least, it is what I intended it to be. The debate of concernis whether meaning is intrinsically normative – whether the facts of meaning havenormative content. I think there is a way of thinking about language that suggests itdoes. It is a way of thinking about language that, I think, is not without value.
This essay is split up into three chapters: the first deals with understanding what theclaim that meaning is intrinsically normative amounts to; the second discusses someproblems that face those who have held it to be true; the third proposes a kind ofNormativism that is unaffected by many of the arguments discussed in Chapter 2and elsewhere.
More specifically, Chapter 1 seeks to answer to question of what is it for something,in this case meaning, to be intrinsically normative. For, any such claim, if true, isgoing to cause trouble for the naturalistically inclined. For familiar Humean reasons,one cannot infer from some description of how the world is, that anything ought tobe the case. There are, though, some 'ought's that are not naturalisticallyproblematic. These are the 'ought's that feature in hypothetical imperatives – claims(roughly) of the form, if you want to ∂, you ought to ß. Such 'ought' claims canplausibly be construed as little more than descriptions of how some contingent endcan be achieved (i.e. as 'is' claims). Thus, if it can be shown that any 'ought' thatfeatures in claims as to what terms mean is the sort of 'ought' that features in
9hypothetical imperatives, then the naturalist can breath easy, with respect tomeaning at least. And, if these are the only kinds of 'ought's in the offing, that wouldbe inconsistent with the idea that meaning is intrinsically normative. Claims that areintrinsically normative feature normative language that is not equivalent to thatwhich features in hypothetical imperatives. Thus, a naturalist would find it convivialif the 'ought's that can be derived from claims about what words and sentencesmean had to be such that they were dependent on the ends of agents in the sameway as the 'ought's that feature hypothetical imperatives. And, it turns out, thereseems reason for thinking that meaning is dependent on at least some very broaddesires of those who mean anything with the language that they use. AlexanderMiller, for example, tells us that we must at least have the desire to communicate ifany kind of normativity associated with meaning is going to have some force. Thus,it may be taken that in virtue of such instrumentality, the 'ought's governingmeaning must be instrumental, and thereby (though this is the move I intend toquestion) only akin to those that feature in hypothetical imperatives.
I take the argument just presented to be too quick, and endeavour to show that thereis a way of thinking about language that can accommodate Miller's thought, butnonetheless conceive of meaning as intrinsically normative. The chapter ends with aproposal for a framework in which this understanding of intrinsic normativity mightbear on language – it is a framework that conceives of language, primarily, as apractice. I am not, though, the originator of this thought. Far from it. Somethingsimilar can be read into the Philosophical Investigations. In matters of presentconcern, Alan Millar (as opposed to Alexander Miller) has suggested such anunderstanding of language. Thus it may appear that I am offering arguments insupport of Millar's peculiar form of Normativism; it is true that what I say here is inagreement with Millar on many points. But I do not endorse his Normativism. As towhy, will become clear in Chapters 2 and, in particular, 3.
Much of the role that Chapter 2 plays is clearing ground for Chapter 3; it shows hownon-Normativists have successfully argued against certain forms of Normativism.However, the arguments they present are dependent on the acceptance of a'meaning platitude' (that is indeed accepted by the forms of Normativism they argueagainst) which I feel to be detrimental to the Normativist cause, and, in any case, not
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a platitude about meaning. In particular, the formulation on offer – that takes it,platitudinously, that meaningful expressions possess conditions for correctapplication – allows for meaning to be thus understood of instrumental value to theend of expressing (something like) truth. But, the end of expressing truth is acontingent one – if meaning's job is only to aid that end, then the normativeimplications of such a claim only go so far as to describe how such an end could befulfilled. Thus, the 'ought's that feature in the equivalent formulations of the'platitude' are only indicative of some hypothetical imperatives that would hold forthose wanting to express truth.
I take it, though, that this 'platitude' could not feature as such in a conception oflanguage as a practice as sketched at the end of Chapter 1. Instead, I suggest, thebest we can come up with is that meaningful expressions possess conditions forcorrect use. How this contrasts with the former formulation of the platitude is setout in more detail in Chapter 3, but the central point is that the 'platitude', as it is setout in the literature, has a focus that is ill-placed.
So I finally come to Chapter 3, which attempts to fill in some of the blanks. It does so,though, only given certain controversial premises – particularly regarding the natureof truth. I do not, here, want to endorse or reject any of these premises. Instead, Ijust try to show that, from the point of view of Normativists, such conceptions canhelp in combating the objections that they have been subject to. So, I want to saythat Normativism can hold given the acceptance of certain premises about thenature of truth, but leave it open whether such premises, ultimately, are plausible. Iwill admit, though, I do think that many of these points, upon which I build suchNormativism, are not only plausible but true.
So, I invoke the historic debate between J. L. Austin and P F. Strawson on what it isthat is the fundamental bearer of truth. By taking note of some of the distinctionsthat each make, particularly between 'sentences' and 'statements', I derive anunderstanding in which one can see questions of meaning falling under the remit ofthe former and any other 'norms' (especially the sort of 'norms' that are normativerequirements of hypothetical imperatives that populate our particular uses oflanguage) will be those that govern the making of statements.
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I then discuss at more length Alan Millar's version of Normativism, showing how it isdistinct from the conception that I examined in Chapter 2. I find a lot that ispromising in Millar's proposal – after all, it is from him that one can specifically tracethe idea that Normativism best makes sense in the context of thinking of languageuse as a practice. However, I find a couple of short-comings with his specificformulation of the position. In particular, his understanding of the criterion forsemantic correctness in terms of the conditions for the correct applications of termsruns against the arguments of the second chapter. In addition, I also look at someother anti-Normativist arguments by Hattiangadi that invoke (semantic)contextualist manoeuvres. I find that a slight adjustment of Millar's position givenconsiderations from the Austin/Strawson debate can neutralise these problems butit remains unclear whether even the altered position has the necessary means to beable to answer a further non-Normativist worry; one that questions whether such aposition is genuinely normativist. I therefore finish by invoking Austin's conceptionof the relationship between truth and meaning to give an alternative criterion forsemantic correctness that does not rely upon the idea that it be understood in termsof the correct applications of terms. Instead, I offer a sketch of how such a notioncan be understood in terms of the constitutive rules of the practice of language use,and show how the adjusted meaning platitude presented in Chapter 2 supports thatthought. This last proposal is, I contend, genuinely Normativist, but note that itentails substantial and controversial assumptions that themselves may turn out tobe implausible.
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Chapter 1: Intrinsic Normativity and Hypothetical
Imperatives
In this chapter, I first introduce the idea that meaning is intrinsically normative andset out just what features the posited norms will have to have. I then introduce aninitial problem that exploits an apparent incompatibility between the notion thatsemantic correctness is instrumental in value and the thesis that meaning isintrinsically normative. I will show that it is true that such intrinsic normativitycannot be understood in terms of the instrumental value of semantic correctness, ifit is indicative of the kind of instrumental value that features in hypotheticalimperatives. However, I will question whether it has been shown that therequirements laid down by the norms of meaning are to be understood in terms ofhypothetical imperatives, and hence to be seen as resting on desires, or other suchpsychological states, in the way that instrumental value is typically taken to. I thenpropose a framework (one that conceives of language as a practice, and languageusers as participants in that practice) in which the conception of the norms ofmeaning as indicative of nothing more than hypothetical imperatives is false (thoughI leave the issue of how language use can be so thought of until Chapter 3).
An Assumption Questioned
Saul Kripke can be credited with bringing the claim that meaning is (intrinsically)normative most forcibly into philosophical prominence (though he was not the firstto make it). The claim appears as a crucial step in at least one of his (in)famousarguments in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language for a sceptical conclusionabout the facts of meaning. In essence, the problem for Kripke is that for any factsthere are – be they physical or mental – that we could rely on to specify what giventerms mean, such facts are, in principle, incapable of justifying any claims as to how
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one ought to use the terms in question. In particular, the conception that themeaning of terms is identified with a speaker's dispositions to use such terms isincapable of providing the requisite justification for how terms ought to be used.And since it is constitutive of the facts of meaning that they are able to so justify howterms ought to be used, there are no facts of meaning. Boghossian (2005)summarises Kripke's thought by saying,
One could ... not identify meaning facts with dispositional facts because at bottom the relation betweenmeaning and future use is normative, whereas the dispositionalist construes it descriptively (p. 205)
I will not here explore in much depth the well-worn ground as to the success ofKripke's arguments for his sceptical conclusion, but investigate that key claim thatplays such a central role in it – namely, the claim that the facts of meaning must be(intrinsically) normative. That thesis might be thought to be at work1 when Kripkesays,
The point is not that, if I meant addition by"+", I will answer "125," but that, if I intend to accord withmy past meaning of "+", I should answer "125". (Kripke 1982, p. 37)
There is an important distinction to keep in mind in Kripke's discussion (See Miller1998, p. 155). When we say that "125" is the correct answer to the question"68 + 57= ?", it is so according to two factors that, though distinct, work in tandem. There isthe factual sense in which it is the correct answer in virtue of the arithmetic fact that125 is the sum of 68 and 57, and there is what he calls the "metalinguistic" sense inwhich the "+" sign as here used, really is used to mean the addition function. What isof specific concern to Kripke is whether what we mean when we use the "+" sign canreally be thought to pick out that arithmetic function. Now, in the above quotation,Kripke suggests that one should answer "125" to the question; we ought to answerlike that, presumably, because of the way the world is – that 125 is the sum of 68 and57 – and because of what our words mean. It is the way the world is that determineswhether our use of "+" is the correct one. The problem, according to Kripke, is that
1 At least, this is what the quotation is commonly thought to be invoking. There may be reason to
doubt that Kripke really had intrinsic normativity in mind because of the conditional “if I intent
to …”, which could suggest that he was thinking in terms of hypothetical imperatives. Much more
on this shortly, but for the time being I only introduce Kripke as a way of introducing the broad
topic of the thesis, and leave outstanding questions as to his views on the normativity of meaning
to one side.
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there is nothing in our past usage, or our dispositions to use terms in a certain way(there are no facts about the way the world is), that could allow us to justify theclaim that of how the term in question ought to be used.2
The quotation above suggests that the thrust of Kripke's argument is to question thecertainty of whether, given the novelty of the question, my use of the sign was reallyin accord with what it meant. Hence, implicit in this sceptical challenge is thethought that there has to be a sense in which we can assess any such use forcorrectness or incorrectness, and furthermore, that assessment is demonstrative ofthe inherent normativity of signs meaning what they do. Thus, a correct use of "+"would be to use it in accordance with what that sign means, and therefore it is themeaning of the sign that grounds how we ought to use it. Thus, there is a tacit movein Kripke's argument from the notion of correctness to talk of obligations andpermissions which is dependent on the assumption that correctness itself is anormative notion. We shall see in due course that this move is controversial, but theidea behind the move is that, given the obvious fact that uses of words are apt to beassessed as correct or incorrect, facts as to what they mean must be able to justifyhow the term in question should or could be used in the future – so as to be used inaccordance with what it means, not just what it has been used to say, or what we maybe inclined to use it to say.
However, the thought that we are obliged to use words in accordance with theirmeaning is but one way in which the claim that meaning is intrinsically normativecan be understood. Gibbard offers a reading of Kripke that is less specific as to howthe (putative) normativity of meaning is to be thought of:
The crux of the slogan that meaning is normative ... might be another slogan: that means implies ought.To use roughly Kripke's example, from statements saying what I mean by the plus sign and otherarithmetic terms and constructions, it will follow that I ought to answer '7' when asked 'What's 5 + 2?'(Gibbard 1994, p. 100, cf. Millar 2004, pp. 159 - 160)
2 It is worth mentioning, of course, that Kripke's thought here is inspired, at least to some extent, by amore traditional discussion of normativity in (meta)ethics. The problem resembles Hume's diagnosisthat 'ought' does not imply 'is', as well as, of course Moore’s open-question argument against thepossibility of naturalising (genuinely) normative claims. However, it should be noted that the mannerin which Kripke invokes this thought is distinct in a number of important ways to the arguments aspresented in Hume and Moore (see for more detail Zalabardo 1997).
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This leaves it open whether the normativity involved is to be understood in terms ofobligations (or perhaps permissions) to use words in accordance with theirmeaning, or whether there is some other sense in which we ought to (or may) useterms – there are other standards that meaning imposes on use. Correlative to thisway of thinking of the normativity of meaning, Daniel Whiting (2009) tells us thatthe Normativity Thesis says the following:
Meaning is intrinsically normative, ... facts about meaning ... are inherently action-guiding orprescriptive; specifically, they have implications for what a subject may or should (not) do. (p. 536)
Whiting's formulation can seem quite natural, but it is a formulation that makes useof a specific notion of normativity; one of a couple that the general notion ofnormativity can encompass. As Jonathan Dancy says,
It is often said that normativity is the characteristic common to everything that appears on the "ought"side of the distinction between what is and what ought to be. (Dancy, 2000 p. vii)
But, this "ought" has a wider sense than is obvious from common usage because,
Normativity is a feature common to both sides of the evaluative/deontic distinction. (Ibid)
The simplest way to understand this distinction is in terms of how one ought to be(what something ought to be like), and what one ought to do (how something oughtto act). This distinction may turn out to be important in what follows. In any case, itis generally taken, and this is how Whiting and his critics seem to take it, that thenormativity of meaning is to be understood as having implications for what oneought to do (how one ought to use one's terms), given the relevant notion ofnormativity for them is one that is action-guiding, rather than a.... After all, if a claimabout meaning is normative, it would seem natural to construe it as havingimplications for what one ought (not) to, or may (not), do – namely, how one ought(not), or may (not), use the terms in question. As such, one can assess whether anaction the norm was meant to be guiding – in this case, the use of some specificfragment of language – satisfies the conditions it has set down for correct action; ifsome F is normative in this way, then there are conditions for correct actionaccording to F. As such, one has either acted correctly or incorrectly, if one has acted
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so as to be governed by norms of this kind. However, it is worth noting, that acommon contention of opponents to Normativism is that it does not follow thatgiven there are conditions for correctness, it need be the case that there are normsthat are specifically associated with, or intrinsic to, that particular thing that can beso assessed. Indeed, for some it is not obvious that 'correct', at least in this context,is a normative notion at all. This is a controversy that was not always recognised inthe vast body of literature that followed the publication of Kripke's arguments:
Our topic is the fact that terms of a language are governed by rules that determine what constitutescorrect and incorrect application of them. (Blackburn 1984, p. 28)
And Paul Boghossian, at one point, seemed to take it as read that some form of theNormativity Thesis is true:
The normativity of meaning turns out to be ... simply a new name for the familiar fact that ... meaningfulexpressions possess conditions of correct use (1989, p. 148).
Indeed, Crispin Wright went so far as to say, that it could be viewed as a 'harmlessplatitude' that meaning is intrinsically normative, given the need for meaningfulexpressions to possess 'correctness conditions' (Wright 1993 p. 247). But thethought is a substantive one, for not only is the move from correctness to talk of'ought' and 'may' not obviously interchangeable as these claims would suggest, but,additionally, Normativism can take a number of forms, some more specific thanothers. From Gibbard, there is the idea that 'means' implies 'ought'; from Kripke,such 'ought's are derived from using language in accordance with its meaning.Others, such as Horwich (1998, p. 184), have concentrated on the constraints thatthe normative aspects of language are going to put on one's theory of meaning.Though, despite these differences, what is common in all these conceptions of theNormativity Thesis is that the facts of meaning have normative content.
But recently the assumption has come under some considerable scrutiny, and, formany though not for all, has been found wanting. The scrutiny has come about,more or less, because of recent interest in defending more sophisticated forms ofdispositional accounts of meaning (such as recent forms of informational semanticsand inferential role semantics) in the face of the arguments that Kripke lodged
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against them. And, given the central role that it plays in his arguments, this has ledto the need to address the (apparent) normative consequences of language use. For,if meaning is intrinsically normative, then dispositional accounts may be in trouble.Intrinsic normativity, at least as far as Kripke is concerned, requires that the facts ofmeaning have a justificatory role to play in answering questions as to how wordsand sentences ought to be used. Since dispositions, at best, tell us how words andsentences are used, they cannot be used by way of justifying answers to suchquestions. At least, so far as Kripke is concerned.
But, why should we think that the normative consequences of language use are
intrinsic to meaning? One need not deny that there are normative consequences oflanguage use tout court in denying that claim. Instead, one could simply allow forsuch consequences from other sources. In which case, so the thought goes,dispositions might be able to have the requisite powers of justification – for, say,judgements about how terms ought to be used, given what they were used for. Sucha manoeuvre is common amongst non-Normativists; it is to claim that semanticcorrectness is an instrumental value (of a specific sort). It is a move that need notdeny that there are normative considerations regarding language use, only that theseare normative considerations that do not result in virtue of words meaning whatthey do. As a consequence, the claim that meaning is intrinsically normative is inopposition to this manoeuvre. Hence, if meaning is intrinsically normative, then thedispositionalist cannot sidestep the issue of normativity in the way just outlined.What, then, is it to make such a claim? What kind of normativity is at work in theNormativity Thesis?
What Kind Of Normativity?
As Whiting well notes,
If the relevant normative implications for how a subject is to employ an expression result from anythingother than facts about what the relevant expression means, then such normative import would seemnot to belong to the nature of meaning as such. (Whiting 2009, pp. 536 - 7)
It is often supposed, then, that the Normativist will have to take the norms ofmeaning, to awkwardly use Kantian terminology, to be categorical imperatives. As I
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am using the phrase, I take the normative force of categorical imperatives not to bederived from the satisfaction of some specific (contingent) ends that someone has.Categorical imperatives at least take into account other reasons to act, other than the
desired end, such that even if ∂'ing is the best way to achieve one's end of ß, there 
may be reason not to ß, thus one ought not to ∂.  In such a case, at least one necessary condition has been satisfied for there being some categorical imperative
governing such an act of ∂'ing (in this case, a categorical imperative that appears to forbid it).3
For this reason, it is widely, but not universally, accepted that the norms governingour ethical practice are paradigmatic of categorical imperatives. The thought is this:if, for example, whilst one is on the way to the pub, one comes across an elderlyperson who has badly injured themselves, one should stop and help the elderlyperson, even if one wants to get drunk – if there is some situation in which someethical principle applies, then, the thought is, it applies in spite of whatever desiresone may have (if one is a moral agent). That is, whether one's specific end issatisfied by helping, or failing to help, such an end isn't meant to enter into aconsideration as to whether one ought to so act. The point being that, if the meaningis intrinsically normative, then it is assumed that this is how the norms of meaningwill operate (even if it turns out this is not the way that the norms of ethics, in fact,operate).
Thus, if that is so, whatever ends one has in speaking as one does (or perhaps evenspeaking at all – I'll return to this), will not be that upon which the relevantnormative implications are based. Hence, if the normative implications for how asubject should use terms result only from what an expression means, the 'ought's (or'may's etc.) that govern semantics must thus be constitutive of the facts of meaning.Accordingly, these 'ought's ('may's) will hold regardless of the specific ends alanguage user has in using the fragments of the language that they did. Rather, theywill have to hold just in virtue of them using the language.
The 'ought's that feature in these kinds of normative constraints are in contrast to
3 That is, of course, if it is not the case that one has some more important or overriding end, thefulfilment of which would be jeopardised in the event of ∂'ing. If that were so, then we would have justanother case of a hypothetical imperative.
19
those that feature in hypothetical imperatives. The value ascribed to the satisfactionof the 'ought' as it features in an hypothetical imperative will therefore at least beinstrumental in the sense given the end that one has, one ought to ∂, given that ∂'ingis (at least) one way in which one will be able to (perhaps partially) achieve that end.Importantly, the 'ought's that can be derived from hypothetical imperatives saynothing as to whether the end one has, for which one pursues the means one does, isitself constrained by any norms; whether that is an end one ought to, or may, pursue.Anthony Price (2004, pp. 60 - 1) gives the example that if one wants to get drunkevery night, then one ought to work in a pub. That 'ought' is meant to signify thatworking in a pub is at least one way in which one can satisfy one's desire orintention to get drunk every night. However, it is open whether one should getdrunk every night. Perhaps one shouldn't. Thus, the kind of normativity at work inthis example is nothing over and above that which applies to hypotheticalimperatives.
Note that, in such cases, it is entirely implausible to say that the 'ought' as it featuresin such hypothetical imperatives is intrinsic to the 'getting drunk'. The 'ought' as itthere features is simply indicative of a way that some end can be satisfied. This iswhy Hattiangadi thinks that,
To say that meaning is normative in this strong sense is to say that what a speaker means determineswhich uses of an expression she ought to make, where this 'ought' is understood to be 'categorical' inthat it is not contingent on the agent's desires or ends (Hattiangadi 2007, p. 6)
And so,
If semantic correctness is merely instrumental, then meaning is not intrinsically normative in anyinteresting sense (Hattiangadi 2010, p. 93).
Hattiangadi (2010, pp. 93 - 4) thus argues that if semantic correctness is understoodas instrumental, then it follows that the norms governing the use of language are notintrinsic to the meanings of the terms used. Thus, if it is correct for one to use x in acertain way, but it is correct because it fulfils some further end, it cannot be the casethat one ought to use x in that way because of some fact as to what x means, butrather whether it furthers the achievement of some other, non-semantic aim the
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subject has. As such, according to Hattiangadi, if it can be shown that semanticcorrectness must be instrumental in value, then the Normativity Thesis has beenshown to be false.
But, crucially, according to Hattiangadi, the norms involved that are indicative of thekind of instrumental value that is inconsistent with intrinsic normativity must takethe form of what John Broome calls a 'normative requirement', which hedistinguishes from two other normative notions: 'ought' and 'a reason'. Formally,Broome takes 'NR' to capture this relation:
NR: O (p —› q)
Where 'O' is a normative operator, something like (but not exactly) 'you ought to seeto it that', that takes wide scope over the conditional that is meant to express thatdoing q is instrumentally valuable for achieving p, and the '—›' is the materialconditional.4 What is important about normative requirements as Broome sets themout is that the normativity involved cannot be 'detached', because the normativeimport attaches to the conditional rather than either its antecedent or itsconsequent. That simply means that one thing can be in this 'normatively require'relation with another thing, though the first thing obtaining does not thereby meanthat the second is demanded (normatively). And we have seen that that is true ofhypothetical imperatives – just because acting in one way is a means to achievingsome further end, it does not mean that one should pursue that end in the first place.Returning to Price’s example, one cannot detach the consequent of “if one wants toget drunk every night, then one ought to work in a pub”. That is, one cannot inferthat one ought to work in a pub (considering the conditional in isolation) in anyother way than it being instrumental, in the relevant respects, to achieving the end ofgetting drunk every night. Semi-formally, according to Broome’s notation, thatconditional can be construed as,
4 Broome is well aware that such formalisations don’t translate easily into English, and it is unclear thatas they would ordinarily be taken, they would mean the same as the sort of claims they are meant to beformalisations of. Broome insists, however, that they should be taken as such – the uneasiness of thenatural language translations is simply due to the need for his logical apparatus to range overpropositions, which is how he formalizes normative talk that doesn’t translate easily into sentenceswith ‘that’ clauses.
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O ((one wants to get drunk every night) —› (work in a pub))
The ‘ought’ ranges over the whole conditional, but can be thought to range overneither its antecedent nor its consequent. And it is this relation that, for Hattiangadi,captures the normativity that is at work when things are of instrumental value in theway that she takes meaning to be.
As to whether Hattiangadi is correct in this, we shall have to see, but even if she is,why is it important for the non-Normativist that the relevant normativity beproperly captured by this relation? Well, according to Hattiangadi there is no waysuch a result can be thought to be compatible with the normativity involved beingintrinsic to the activity with which it is associated – that is, normative requirementsare not intrinsic to the things that we may think of as requiring them – namely the(desiring of) the ends one has (the right hand side of the conditional). We can seewhy that is so once we recognise that intrinsic normativity must allow fordetachment in a way that normative requirements do not allow for – if something isintrinsically normative, the normativity must go everywhere. To return to Price'sexample, we have the hypothetical imperative that if one intends to get drunk everyevening then one should work in a pub. However, it may not be the case that oneought to get drunk every evening in the first place. Nonetheless, let's say that oneintends to get drunk every evening. In such a case, Broome contends, it is not thecase that one ought to work in a pub. Thus, the kind of normativity at work in suchcases does not allow for the 'detachment' of the ought of the consequent, even if theantecedent is satisfied. It is for that reason that hypothetical imperatives only exertnormative requirements upon those for whom the hypothetical imperative applies,which leaves it open whether one really should act so as to satisfy it.
The consequence of this, according to Hattiangadi, is that,
The general, wide scope requirement that one ought to take the necessary means to satisfy one'sintentions is a rule of practical rationality, not semantics. Facts about meaning ... can [...] be relevant towhat you ought to do if you are to satisfy your intentions, and such facts can be relevant to whatconstitutes satisfying requirements of practical rationality. (Hattiangadi 2010, p. 94)
Hattiangadi takes it that the way in which normativity is manifest in hypothetical
22
imperatives, it patently is not in the remit of semantics but rather of practical
rationality. That, I take it, is just because the manner in which one is to achieve theends one has is not the remit of semantics but, apparently, practical rationality. Inany case, the negative point is surely right, so it will be enough for Hattiangadi, inorder to undermine the normativity thesis, to establish that the 'ought's that featurein the normative equivalent of statements about meaning have to be of the kind thatfeature in such statements of hypothetical imperatives.
Thus, if the norms that govern meaning can be shown to be merely normativerequirements in (something close to) Broome's sense, then the Normativity Thesiswill thereby be shown to be false. In sum:
P1: If meaning is intrinsically normative, then it is not the case thatthe only norms governing meaning are normative requirements ofhypothetical imperatives
P2: The only norms governing meaning are normative requirementsof hypothetical imperatives.
C: Meaning is not intrinsically normative.
If the argument is sound, then the Normativity Thesis is false. Hence, if theNormativity Thesis is to be defended, then this argument needs to be answered. Itcan be so, as with all such arguments, by denying its validity, or rejecting one of thepremises. I take it that the argument is valid, so one of the premises must be false ifthe Normativity Thesis is true.
I take it that P1 is true. The reasons for this we have already seen. However, theimplicit assumption in P1 that the normative force of hypothetical imperatives isfully captured by Broome's notion of a 'normative requirement' is morecontroversial.5 But let's grant this much: it may not matter just what formulation of
5 One issue that should just be earmarked is that it isn't given that there are even any such things asnormative requirements as Broome sets them out. Their invocation is meant to be a solution to aproblem – that is how we are to formally account for the kinds of conditionals that feature inhypothetical imperatives. People are divided as to the best way to do that. Jonathan Dancy, for
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this kind of normativity we settle on, but just that there is a kind of normativity thatcannot be detached in the way that demands and reasons can be, and that is the kindof normativity that is at work in the claim that meaning is normative. Thus, I willhere, following Broome, call that kind of normativity 'normative requirement', butleave it open whether Broome has fully and correctly captured that notion in hisformal characterization of it. Indeed, as we shall see, I can leave it open as towhether there are any instances of normative requirements, because I will argue, atleast, that meaning normativity need not be thought of as of this form, and that is allthat is of present concern.
The Crux: Are The Norms of Meaning 'Normative Requirements'?6
So, this is the question: are the norms of meaning only ever instances of normativerequirements? In support of a positive answer, the non-Normativist will typicallysay that there is always some further end to which language use is a means so as toestablish the claim that semantic correctness is instrumental in value. AlexanderMiller says this:
The most that can be said is that if Neil means magpie by "magpie" then given that he has a desire to
communicate, or perhaps a desire to think the truth, or a desire to conform to his prior semantic
intentions, he has a reason to apply "magpie" to an object if and only if it is a magpie (Miller 2006, p.109).
And Miller seems to be right in this. One must at least be in the game ofcommunicating to be governed by any norms that contribute to communication. Ifone has no interest in communicating, then it seems implausible to say that oneought to act so as to communicate. It thus appears that the idea of the normativity ofmeaning is, at least in this very broad sense, dependent on certain psychologicalstates of subjects that are capable of conveying it.
example, is unconvinced that the best way to represent the kind of phenomena that Broome is trying tocapture formally with his 'normative requirements' is via a relation. The point is that 'normativerequirements' are meant to play a specific role. It is that which plays that role (i.e. the 'ought's ofhypothetical imperatives) which is important, and for the present purposes, normative requirements asset out by Broome capture them adequately.
6 By way of warning, the two main protagonists in this section are Alexander Miller and Alan Millar.The similarity of the names cannot be helped, so the reader, I'm afraid, needs to be careful about who iswhom.
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So Miller seems to have given us reason to think that semantic correctness must bethought of as an instrumental value due to the fact there are at least some common,broad ends upon which engagement in language use is dependent – such as the endof communicating. Thus, it may seem that Miller's contention invalidates theNormativity Thesis. For if Hattiangadi is right that semantic correctness is derivativefrom the satisfaction of some hypothetical imperative then the sort of normativity atwork cannot be intrinsic to meaning. The problem is that it isn't clear that in virtueof semantic correctness being instrumental in value – in particular, in the way thatMiller identifies – that it follows that such correctness only gets its normative forcein virtue of its ability to specify how some contingent end could be achieved. Forthat to be so, it must be the case that the contingency of language use on the desireto communicate ensures that the relevant norms of meaning must be nothing morethan normative requirements of hypothetical imperatives.
The hallmark of some act being of instrumental value is that it is performed in orderto achieve, or partially realise, some further end. Thus, one acts in that way only if itwill (or seems as though it will) further or realise such an end. The action ahypothetical imperative recommends will be instrumental in this sense, but willadditionally have to be such that it is left open whether the end for which thehypothetical imperative recommends a means is itself worth pursuing. That is justto say that the consequent of the conditional that makes up the hypotheticalimperative cannot be detached, even if the antecedent is satisfied. And the argumentabove only showed that these normative requirements are inconsistent withintrinsic normativity. Thus, the non-Normativist must show that semanticcorrectness being an instrumental value in the way Miller specifies is the sort ofinstrumental value that features in the satisfaction of hypothetical imperatives.
Hence, the question now is: can there be any such cases in which the relevant notionof correctness is instrumental, but in a way that the 'ought' of the consequent can bedetached? And, if there were such a notion of correctness, can it capture the relevantnotion of semantic correctness? And if it did, would it be able to support the ideathat there are intrinsic norms of meaning? One way in which this might be achievedis if the norms of meaning can be thought of, not as means to a further end, but
constitutive of the end itself. For if the norms of meaning could be so thought of,
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then it would be the case that semantic correctness remains instrumentally valuablewhile, at the same time, detachment of the consequent of the relevant conditionalwould still be possible.
Here's a thought as to how that can seem plausible. When it comes to language use,it is the case that one's particular ends in so using it are not what induces the sort ofnormativity that is peculiar to meaning. Nonetheless, the value attached to meaningso-and-so is instrumental in the sense that it contributes to the broad end ofcommunicating, but not to the ends one has in communicating. Thus meaning, soconceived, isn't a self-standing end of intrinsic value. But, that does not falsify theclaim that meaning itself is intrinsically normative. Meaning can, plausibly, onlycome about in a context in which there are those communicating. If it can be shownthat there is a coherent idea of what it would be for meaning to have that role, thenmeaning, within that broad context of communicators, would have to be understoodas intrinsically normative for communicators. The result of that being that therebeing any meaning at all – for there to be facts of meaning – there must be those whocommunicate (or are capable of communication).
Importantly, however, though semantic correctness will be instrumentally valuable(at least in some very broad sense), it will not be such, so as to make it the case thatwhat is semantically correct is merely 'normatively required' in the presentlyrelevant sense. That is demonstrated by the fact that the consequent of theconditional that demonstrates its instrumental value can be detached when theantecedent is satisfied, if we think of things in the following way: if one is aparticipant in the practice of communication, or language use, one is thereby underobligation to act in a way that is in accord with the rules of that practice, where apractice is understood as a system of rules.
So, the shape of the proposal is that we think of meaning in terms of the norms (orrules) governing a practice. For the present concerns, the proposal is that we thinkabout language use in terms of the participation in a practice. Such a thought, so faras it goes, is not a new one. It can be traced back to passages in Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations and is a thought that is relied upon, in varying degrees,for many since. One such is Alan Millar. Millar will have his part to play yet, but for
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the time being, it is worth seeing what he says with regards to practices that mayhelp the Normativist accommodate Alexander Miller's claim as to the necessarycontingency of language use on certain desires, without invalidating the claim tointrinsic normativity:
Participating in the practice makes one subject to that rule although, as with other practices, likeplaying a game of soccer, one may participate in the practice and also flout the rules ... [but]participating in a practice incurs a commitment to following its governing rules and therefore to doingwhat the rules prescribe. (Millar 2004, p. 168)
In this light, one may insist that Miller's challenge is, effectively, saying that one maynot be a participant in the practice of using language (by having no intention tocommunicate). In which case, one is not obliged to do anything that so participatingwould normatively commit one to. But that does not undermine the idea that, forparticipants of that practice, there are norms intrinsic to it that govern them, or so isthe present line of thought. If meaning is thought of in this way – such that it isconstitutive of the practice that words mean what they do – then, given one is in that
practice, in virtue of words meaning what they do, one ought to use them in certainways. Another way to put this is that there are certain things (namely, that whichcommunication enables) that only participating in the practice of using a languagewill allow (call this the ‘L-practice); just those sorts of things that can only be donewith language.
If that is right, then the thought seems to be that once one is a participant in thepractice, one is thereby obliged to act in certain ways. So, something needs to besaid about what makes one a participant, and how such a status can be gained andlost. For, if that status can be lost just in virtue of the dropping of certain desires, itmay appear that the relevant normative constraints cannot support the claim that infavour of intrinsic normativity. For, the proposal says that part of what it is for someagent to be a participant in the practice of language use (the L-practice) is for themto have certain desires or intentions – such as the intention to communicate. Thus,we appear to have the conditional 'if one wants to communicate, then one ought toact in accordance with the rules of the L-practice'. In order for the 'ought' there to beindicative of intrinsic normativity it may seem that it must be able to be detached.But, it seems as though it cannot be detached – i.e. it is not true that one ought to act
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in accordance with these putative rules, once that desire is lost.
But that conditional is misleading; communicating just is participating in the L-practice. Thus, dropping the intention to communicate means that one ceases to bea participant in the L-practice. But the L-practice enables certain types of actions,the L-practice is the practice in which meaning occurs. So, failing to be a participantin the L-practice results in one failing to have the means to achieve certain ends; thesorts of desires that Miller specifies are the kinds of desires required to be aparticipant in the L-practice. That is, to be such as to be able to mean anything at all.The L-practice itself is conceived of as a system of rules which any such participantof the practice is governed by. Once one chooses to be meaningful (i.e.communicate), one thereby is under certain obligations. One can act in conflict withthe rules that constitute meaningfulness and so act in a way one ought not to, butonly given that status as a participant in the L-practice. If, for example, a participanthad the desire to describe something in a circumstance, then there are certain thingsthey would have to do that only participating allows – like use the sorts of predicatesthat could be satisfied by the object described. Those constraints are not specificallytied to the making of the description per se, so the thought goes, but are setaccording to the practice in which one has placed oneself; once one enters into thatpractice, there are certain obligations that one is under as a participant – that is,within the practice, there are certain actions one should perform (given certaincircumstances that one finds oneself, as a participant, in). Once one is in thatpractice (a participant), any subsequent desires, that the acting upon which wouldcontravene its rules, cannot discharge one from having the normative commitmentsthat come with so participating. The norms hold as norms, only, one may have noreason to follow them.
So the proposal is that L-practice should be regarded as a set of the vast, perhapsindefinite, activities that language use enables. (Such activities can be thought of, ifone is so inclined as language games). Each, in their circumstances, has rules for theways one can achieve certain ends. But, so participating, so the thought goes, is theonly way in which many such ends could be achieved. Those kinds of ends that onethus has (those sorts of ends that can be put under the broad category ofcommunication) are constituted by certain norms, or rules, governing this vast array
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of activities that come under the broad label of the L-practice; it is constitutive of theend of, say, describing the colour of some leaves that one obeys the rules whichgovern description (in the circumstances in which the description is made). Thethought is that something like a description of those leaves in a circumstance, as wellas other kinds of speech acts in other circumstances, are constitutive of the L-practice, and itself to be understood in terms of the rules that govern theachievement of such an end in individual circumstances. Importantly, though, thereare at least some such norms that are not tied to the desires to perform any givenspeech act, only that in order to perform such speech acts, one must act inaccordance with one or other rule of the L-practice. The key is that, the normativeforce of the rules governing the L-practice cannot be lost by dropping desires thatone may have as a participant in the practice. Meaning, such is the suggestion, setsthe conditions under which such ends can be achieved. If that is the case then, thesorts of hypothetical imperatives that non-Normatives typically rely upon are notnorms of meaning per se, but, rather norms that are dependent upon what meaningthus allows.
Remember, the normativity thesis takes it that the facts of meaning have normativecontent. The thought here is that the facts of meaning are rules governing uses ofexpressions in particular circumstances. It is true that, on this suggestion, one's actswill only be governed by such rules if one participates in the practice that theygovern. And thought it would be true that the uses of expressions over for whichsuch rules govern are used to fulfil certain aims, these are aims that can only beachieved by way of following these rules. The facts of meaning, then, just are thefacts as to what those rules require. And the rules, in general terms, are thought ofas requiring that certain conditions are met so as to perform certain kinds of acts.
Of course, the non-Normativist may well reject the idea that there are intrinsicnorms of practices – that is, they may well insist that any such norms that govern aparticipant are still contingent on certain desires to, say, win in that practice orsimply achieve some other end. Though that point has not been established by theconsiderations above. What counts as normative, and in particular intrinsicallynormative, has not been fully captured by the concentration of non-Normativists onjust what obligations one has, and the different ways they have identified that one
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can be obliged. That is instrumentality does not obviously rule out intrinsicality. Forthere is reason to think that there are rules that are governing one in virtue of oneentering into a practice, and, so the present thought goes, we have entered such apractice when we are using a language.
That framework is consistent with the thought that one can incur obligations invirtue of words meaning what they do, given that one is a participant in the practiceof language use – the practice within which words have meaning. So, if the claimthat meaning is intrinsically normative is to be understood as a claim as to in virtueof what one is obliged to act in certain ways, for the present case, it was in virtue ofwords meaning what they do, within the practice of language use, that one incurssuch obligations. Correlatively, then, we have the idea that in virtue of one being alanguage user, one is obliged to act in certain ways. The thought is that the verynotion of words having a meaning can only be made sense of within the context ofthere being a practice of language use. And so, as language users, we are therebyunder obligation to use words in certain ways, given the meaning of those words asconstitutive of the practice in which they participate.
Perhaps a useful comparison to illustrate this thought is Philippa Foot's discussion ofthe norms of etiquette in Morality As A System of Hypothetical Imperatives (1972, pp.308-9). Here Foot argues (though has subsequently come to change her position)that etiquette can be regarded as a system of rules. This is the current proposal as tohow to regard language use. Why this can be important is that perhaps language canbe thought of like Foot (here) thinks of etiquette. If that is somewhere near thecorrect model of language use, the relevant normative relation that speakers have toit would not be means-ends in the way that Hattiangadi suggests, for, in that case,speakers would have to be related to language use in such a way that the onlyrelevant norms are normative requirements of hypothetical imperatives. The pointbeing, that our engagement with such norms, though not of the hypotheticalimperative form, can be conditional on our desires – such as the broad desire tocommunicate. But being so conditional does not invalidate the claim that the normsgoverning the practice are norms nonetheless – and indeed can be made consistentwith the claim that the norms are intrinsic to meaning if the associated rules areconstitutive of the practice of language use. In any case, it seems entirely
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implausible that these could be reduced simply to norms of practical rationality that,if true, P2 (see p. 24) would suggest.
The Problem With Normativists
A recent defence of Normativism by Daniel Whiting (2007, 2009) does not take thisroute. He attempts to derive normative truths from apparently uncontroversialclaims about the correct applications of words and sentences. I will argue that thisroute to the Normativity Thesis is blocked by the fact that the applications of wordsand sentences, as understood by Whiting, are governed by normative requirementsof hypothetical imperatives. However, I will show that the Normativist can acceptthe contingency on intention that is rife in such cases. As such, the Normativist canaccept the simple argument against them in so far as it shows that certain specificcases of language use – i.e. using a language to do that, in this circumstance – can besubject to the normative requirements of hypothetical imperatives. That is hardlysurprising – speakers use language to achieve all sorts of ends that are so contingenton their desires. That, though, is not enough to show that meaning is notintrinsically normative.
In what follows, therefore, I will show how Whiting's focus is mistaken, and showhow non-Normativists can successfully undermine his form of Normativism. In sodoing, I will highlight the ways in which Normativism will have to diverge fromWhiting in its formulation so as to avoid the problems that Whiting is confrontedwith. This will involve not denying what non-Normativists have said in response toWhiting, but instead accommodating the instrumental value (even as it features inhypothetical imperatives) associated within specific uses of language within aframework of meaning understood as intrinsically normative. In the third chapter Iwill give reasons for thinking that there is such a framework, given certainassumptions about when what we say is true, and argue that is unaffected by recentnon-Normativist arguments.
So, Chapter 3 will be a development of the proposal of thinking of language use as apractice in light of objections to recent forms of Normativism that are discussed inChapter 2.
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Chapter 2: The Hypothetical Imperatives in Use
This chapter begins by assessing some positive arguments for Normativism. One inparticular – Whiting's – argues that given an accepted platitude about meaning,Normativism follows. I will argue that non-Normativists are correct in arguing thatit does not. However, I maintain that this 'platitude', as it appears in the literature, isnot such – in any case, it is not a platitude about meaning. In order to do so, I willintroduce a distinction between the notions of correct application and correct use,such that if it is taken to be a platitude about meaning that meaningful expressionspossess conditions for correct application then it is true that Normativism does notfollow from such a 'platitude'. In chapter 3 I will make precise just what it would beto satisfy a condition for correct use, and offer a framework in which it would becorrect to think that meaningful expressions are subject to such conditions –conditions that hold in virtue of normative truths that are constitutive of facts ofmeaning.
Hence, the aim of this chapter is little more than ground clearing for Chapter 3. I willargue that if, as Daniel Whiting does, one understands the conditions for correctnessas they feature in the 'platitude' in terms of correct applications of terms, the non-Normativists can successfully argue that such correctness should be conceived asinstrumental in achieving some further end of language users, in such a way as to bedemonstrative of a hypothetical imperative that will be at work, and nothing more. Iargue, given the formulation some non-Normativists use invokes the notion ofcorrect application, it is only a platitude for statements that purport to express truth.Such statements are, plausibly, governed by norms that are to be understood ashypothetical imperatives, in so far as the value upon which semantic correctness isjudged is truth. That is why the non-Normativist arguments are difficult to rebutonce this formulation of the 'platitude' is accepted.
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Yet, for all that, I take it as spurious to call such a formulation a 'meaning platitude';non-Normativists (and, of course, some Normativists) are mistaken in thinking thatthis is a platitude of meaning. Accordingly, I motivate the another understanding ofthe meaning platitude, and thus one can formulate the idea of conditions for correctuse in such a way that does not tie the idea of semantic correctness too closely to thecontingent end of expressing truth.
Meaning and Correctness
Now, both sides of the debate want to hold onto the idea that language users can besaid to be correct or incorrect in using the expressions that they do. In fact, bothagree that this must be the case for the expression to count as meaningful; that is, onthe grounds that it is a platitude that uses of meaningful expressions must be so aptfor assessment. Hattiangadi offers one common way of justifying the thought asplatitudinous:
It hardly seems open to us to deny that in order to have meaning, terms must have correctnessconditions. This is what distinguishes the use of language from the making of mere noise (Hattiangadi2006, p. 222)
The divergence comes with regards to in virtue of what language users are to be sodeemed to have acted correctly or incorrectly. The non-Normativist will deny that itfollows form the platitude that meaning is intrinsically normative; for Whiting, onthe other hand, it immediately follows – it is the normative constraints on languagethat distinguish it from mere noise. The substance of the debate is thus over whatfollows from the platitude: Whiting sees the platitude extending to encompass theNormativity Thesis, his opponents deny this. Accordingly, it is taken to be the casethat, either it is merely platitudinous that ascriptions of meaning are normativestatements, or else meaning normativity, at any rate, has nothing to do with such
aptness of assessment (Glüer 2009, Hattiangadi 2006, Boghossian 2005).  If we take the later, non-Normativist option, it has to be the case that ascriptions of meaningare descriptive statements that can feature, in so far as any descriptive statementcan, in normative requirements of hypothetical imperatives. If the norms of meaningare so understood, the sense in which it is correct or incorrect to use a certain term
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will turn on precisely the goals one set out to achieve in using the terms as one did.If so, then 'correctness' as it features in the 'platitude' is nothing more that indicativeof the manner in which some contingent end can be satisfied.
Hence, if the non-Normativist is to establish that the norms of meaning arenormative requirements of hypothetical imperatives, part of her project will have tobe to successfully argue that such assessments of correctness as they feature in theplatitude, at the very least, are not made true by facts of meaning, but ratheraccording to whether so speaking is, indeed, a means to some contingent end thespeaker has in that circumstance.
But what, in fact, does this putative 'platitude' say? One informal construal of theplatitude is expressed by Whiting as follows:
From the fact that an expression has a particular meaning it follows that certain uses of it are correctand incorrect. (Whiting 2009, p. 537)
This idea has been given a distinctive gloss and specification in the literature – onethat has been advocated as a platitude by Normativists and non-Normativists alike
(See Glüer 2009; Hattiangadi, 2006 p. 222; Whiting, 2009 p. 537):
(C) w means F —› (x)(S correctly applies w to x ‹—› x is f)
Where, w is some word, F gives its meaning and f is the feature in virtue of which wapplies. Hattiangadi says this of (C):
The expression 'applies correctly' is a place-holder for various semantic relations a term can have to theworld: 't applies correctly to x' stands for 't refers to x', 't denotes x', 't is true of x'. (2006, p. 222)
Take one of her particular cases: the case of naming. It is clear that Hattiangadiregards the notion of applying names correctly just to be referring. Hence, if w is aname, then it meaning F will just be to say that it refers to some x, as long as that x isan f. I am happy to assent to this idea of what correct application amounts to –namely, that the correct application of a word or sentence is tantamount to using ittruly. What Hattiangadi then goes on to argue is that with correctness so
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understood, there is no reason to think that any associated normativity – if there isindeed any – need be understood as resulting from what the terms in question mean.To see how, however, we need to get clear two things: first what Whiting's positiveargument is and then, from this, get clear on the state of the dialectic.
From Correctness To Normativity: Whiting's Argument
Given, as we have seen, Whiting takes normative truths to immediately follow from(C), statements of such truths will be equivalent to (C), and thus, themselvesplatitudes. So, Whiting (2009, p. 544 – 5) has (eventually) arrived at what he takesto be the normative equivalent to (C) to be7:
(P') w means F —› (x)(S ought not to (apply w to x) ‹—› x is not f)
Which is, in turn, equivalent to:
(P'') w means F —› (x)(S may (apply w to x) ‹—› x is f)
Given the nature of Whiting's partisanship in favour of Normativism, it isunsurprising that he takes it to be the non-Normativist's task to prove that (C) doesnot imply both (P') and (P''). As a consequence, charges of question begging aretossed about liberally from both sides of the debate (of course, non-Normativiststake the burden of proof to be borne by the Normativist). We shall see in due coursewhether any such charges are warranted. Let's, though, start with Whiting's side ofthe story.
Whiting begins with the presumption that 'correctness' just is a normative notion.Indeed, pre-philosophically, that hardly seems deplorable – most people wouldaccept that one should do what it is correct to do. As such, Whiting feels that there ispressure already on the non-Normativist to show that correctness is not a normativenotion, and, perhaps more importantly, that correctness isn't normative as it appearsin (C).
7These are not the first formulations that Whiting came up with. Previous attempts have beenacknowledged by Whiting to have been successfully rebutted by some arguments by Hattiangadi 2006.See below for further detail.
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Boghossian (2005) has a stab at this – promoting a position which could plausibly betaken to be in opposition to his previous commitments in print. In his (1989),remember, he said:
The normativity of meaning turns out to be ... simply a new name for the familiar fact that ... meaningfulexpressions possess conditions of correct use (1989, p. 148).
That can, at least, be construed as a statement of Whiting's idea that it simply followsfrom meaningful expressions having conditions for correct use that meaning isintrinsically normative.8 However, now Boghossian (2005) thinks that that there areconditions of correctness that do govern meaningful expressions that need not beindicative of any normative truths inherent in the notion of meaning. For, in contrastto Whiting, he takes it that only sometimes is the application 'correct' indicative ofnormativity, and, as it happens, when applied in these kinds of ways to linguisticexpression, it turns out not to be:
It is not clear that, at least as it is being used here, 'correct' expresses a normative notion, for it may justmean true. (Boghossian 2005, p. 207)
The thought being that correctness with regards to how we use the expressions thatwe do can often just refer to whether what we said was true or not. That isespecially true, I note, when the relevant notion of correctness is to be understood ascorrect application. The question is, is it only when we speak truth that we can deemsomeone to have spoken correctly – in the sense that it is semantically correct forone to do so. I take it that semantic correctness is meant to result in meaningfulness,given we accept some form of the platitude. The non-Normativist, presumably, willbe happy to say that there are other cases – cases in which a truth has not beenexpressed – that will be 'correct'. But, just as expressing truth is of contingentinstrumental value, so will anything else; speaking truth is only the correct thing todo if one aimed to speak truth, and so the 'ought' at work here can easily beconstrued as being nothing more than an 'ought' as it would feature in a hypothetical
8 Though Boghossian is a little more cautious as to what his previous thought really was. He, indeed, inhis 1989 does not translate 'correctness' statements into 'ought' statements, but instead simplyassumes that 'correct' is itself a normative notion.
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imperative.
For example, it may be the case that if one wants to truly describe someone's haircutas looking like a loaf of bread, then one should use words to that effect. But, it maybe the case that one should not describe anyone's hair as looking like a loaf of breadbecause of the offence it will cause. Thus, in the unproblematic way in which'ought's feature in hypothetical imperatives, if one wants to express truth (andthereby offend), and it is true that the person in question has hair that looksremarkably like a loaf of bread, then that is how one ought to describe it. But, if onewants to compliment the person as to their new hair style, it might be the case thatone ought to lie – or, at least, one ought not to so describe their hair. But, in whatsense, in such a situation, would it be 'correct' to describe the person's hair aslooking like a loaf of bread? Boghossian's point is that it is only correct, if correcthere means 'is true'. But, in this situation, it is far from clear that there is anynormative conclusion to be drawn from the fact that it is 'correct' (in this sense) toso describe that person's hair. That is just to say that truth is not itself normative inthis context because the consequent of the sort of hypothetical imperative at workhere cannot be detached.
If so, then we have a notion of correctness with regards to the words that we use thatis understood in terms of truth, that is not an intrinsically normative notion. Hence,one may conclude, the platitude that meaningful expressions have conditions forcorrect application may just be such a case in which correctness is understood not asintrinsically normative, and so we can say that meaningful expressions can havecorrectness conditions without there being any normative implications for meaning.In which case, meaning is not intrinsically normative; the Normativity Thesis is false.
Hattiangadi expands on the sort of thought that Boghossian expresses by locating acrucial equivocation at the heart of claims about how meaning is normative. In onesense of 'normative', meaning is normative, but unproblematically so (in so far as itis not a distinctive kind normativity that philosophers already recognise). There isanother sense of 'normative' that is equivalent to 'prescriptive' which would beproblematic but for the fact that this notion has no place within how we should thinkof meaning (Hattiangadi 2006, p. 221). As far as Hattiangadi is concerned, (C), as it
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stands says nothing that can plausibly be thought to be equivalently construed assome prescriptive statement, so (C) is normative in the sense that is naturalisticallyunproblematic. Specifically, the equivocation that Hattiangadi locates is one that canbe shown by a distinction between 'norm-relativity' and 'normativity' (2007, p. 180).If meaning is merely norm-relative, then it is unproblematic (for the non-Normativist), but if it were normative, it would be. Something is merely norm-relative when there is some norm at work for which so acting would be in line – like,say, the truth norm. But that does not show that that thing is normative. For thepresent case, that is just because a judgement of something being correct (in the'genuine normativity' sense) is meant to motivate one to act ipso facto, whereas, if itis merely norm-relative, there is an additional question to be asked as to whether thenorm to which it is relative is one that one is under. It is 'correct' to speak truly inthis sense, only if one is concerned about truth. But one may not, thus the only'ought' to found is one that features in a hypothetical imperative.
Whiting, however, is unconvinced:
Even if one agrees with the anti-Normativist that truth is a non-normative notion and that claimsconcerning correctness can be straightforwardly transformed into claims about truth, this does nothingto show that claims concerning correctness are non-normative. (2009, p. 539)
Whiting is insisting that even though Boghossian may indeed be right in saying that,in some circumstances, 'correct' and 'is true' can be substituted for one another insuch cases, the Normativist has the necessary tools to accommodate this. For it doesnot follow, according to Whiting, that correctness is a non-normative notion from theconjunction of the ideas that truth can be construed as a non-normative notion andclaims of correctness can be translated into claims about truth. His reason being,following Rosen, that he takes Boghossian here to be confusing two related, butimportantly distinct notions. The notion of primary concern here is the notion of
correctness. But that is to be distinguished from the correct-making-feature, taken tobe 'the property the performance must manifest in order to count as correct' (Rosen2001, p. 619; cf. Whiting 2009, p. 540).
Whiting concludes that,
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Even if one agrees with the anti-Normativist that the pertinent 'word-world relation' is not normative,this does not undermine the view that the property of correctness – possessed in this instance in virtueof the obtaining of the 'word-world relation' – is normative (Ibid)
We have a contrast between the notion of correctness, understood as normative, andthe notion of a correct-making-feature, understood as descriptive (non-normative).So, for Whiting, for the sorts of the cases that Boghossian raises, truth is the correct-
making feature, it virtue of which some utterance is correct. But the fact that it iscorrect is indicative of the normative notion of correctness that is at work – i.e. thatone ought to do that which it correct.
Note, though, that such a 'correct making feature' must be indicative of some normthat requires one to speak truth. But that, surely, doesn't really affect the centralpoint of present concern. For even if truth is the 'correct-making feature' in someinstance, the fact that the token utterance is correct in virtue of it being true cannonetheless be 'correct' in the sense that we have a background concern for truth.That is, in virtue of the correct-making feature being truth, we may have reason tosuspect that the sort of norm for which it is such a feature is one derived from anintention to speak truth. And by the present line of argument, that would appear tobe enough to make obligation one that is as features in hypothetical imperatives. Inother words, the 'normativity' involved here is still predicated on some end alanguage user may have, and thus is only indicative of how such a desire may befulfilled.
So, in order to rule out the thought that such 'correctness' is normative only in so faras it represents the manner in which some contingent end could be fulfilled, it needsto be shown that there is, of necessity in using a language, a background concern fortruth. In which case, the truth norm will always be at work, even in cases in whichwe intuitively think that it is correct to express a non-truth, or correct to not speak atruth. So, the thought is that the sort of conditions for correctness spoken of, if tosupport the Normativity Thesis, must not be as a result of the achievement of somecontingent end, for which applying w to some x is a means to achieving, at least inpart. The non-Normativist, we have seen, has tried to demonstrate this by the factthat when the conditions have failed to be fulfilled, it appears disingenuous to insistthat one has not spoken as one ought to, when, intuitively, it is reasonable and, above
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all, meaningful to have done so.
The Normativist has to have something to say to this. If Normativism is to fit withthe facts, it must allow for such everyday assessments of correctness with regards toour use of language to be accounted for. Thus, Whiting has sought to neutralise sucha problem by invoking the notion of prima facie norms. Prima facie norms arenorms, unlike the 'ought's that feature in hypothetical imperatives, that can only beoverridden (that is, their normative force can be counteracted) if there is some other,contextually more pertinent norm at work that there applies. What Whitingtherefore allows for is that the norms of meaning can be overridden, but only byother norms, such as those governing morals, or prudence. Of course, that meaningnorms are prima facie norms is consistent with the Normativity Thesis becausethese norms, however weak they may be, hold in virtue of facts about meaning. Thisis how Whiting can escape the incompatibility challenge – if he is able to show that,though the norms of meaning can be overridden, they can only be overridden byother norms. That would allow him to locate such norms in the realm of semantics,as opposed to, say, practical reason, while still allowing for the permissibility, incertain circumstances, of speaking falsely.
Such consistency, however, comes at a price. Take a case of decent deception. If it is,in a circumstance, morally preferable to lie, one may say that, in that situation, oneshould lie. If so, then, all things considered one should say that, for example, x is G,when x is, in fact, F. Under Whiting's analysis, then, it is correct to lie, given theoverriding moral norms in play, but there is still a sense in which it was incorrect to
say that x is G:
I might not follow the norm for the use of an expression simply because I do not feel like doing so. Butthat alone does not show that there is no norm in force; my use of the expression should still be judged
incorrect. (Whiting 2007, p.139)
That is simply because there are still norms of meaning at work even in such cases.Take, once again, the case of the bread-like hair. A reason why it may not be correctto describe the hair of the person in question as looking like a loaf of bread is thatthere may be a moral norm in force that forbids one from causing unnecessaryoffence. Thus, the correct thing to do, in this circumstance, is not to say, what the
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hair, in fact, looks like, but to either lie or say nothing as to the look of the hair. Butaccording to Whiting's analysis, one is still (semantically) blameworthy for lying.But one what grounds? Why is truth favoured over falsity so far as the facts ofmeaning are concerned? To insist that it is looks, at best, ad hoc. In any case, in soinsisting, Whiting provokes accusations of question-begging. For the non-Normativist, Whiting is, against all the evidence, insisting that there are norms thatare always in play because they are intrinsic to meaning, even in cases where nosuch norms seem to be present. This should be a last resort, and I don't think thatthe Normativist need be in such a desperate situation yet.9
I suggest that to avoid these kinds of problems satisfactorily, the Normativist shouldabandon dependence on the meaning 'platitude' which relies on the notion of thecorrect application of terms, because this stacks the deck in favour of truth whenthere is no reason why it should. And once truth is not at issue, then there will be nogrounds upon which to deem semantic correctness as an instrumental value inachieving the contingent end of truth. It may turn out, of course, that once truth isout of the picture, then there is no notion of semantic correctness to be found at all.But, I don't think that is true. I will say why presently.
The Normative Implications of Conditions for Correct Application
First, though, I want to look briefly at Whiting's construals of the normativeequivalents to (C). He has come up against objections over what they imply, and hasdealt with these. However, I want to show that despite the alterations, there is stillpreoccupation for truth, which the adjusted principles engender, that leavesuntouched the point that these equivalents are indicative of normative requirementsof hypothetical imperatives. That is simply because of what they are felt to beequivalent to.
Whiting's original construal of the normative equivalent of (C) was in terms of howwords and sentences ought to be applied. However, given pressure from non-Normativists, he has altered this to what we now have in (P') and (P'') – namelyconstruals of (C) in terms of how words and sentences ought not to be applied, and
9 Hattiangadi (2006, pp. 231-2) also has a rejoinder to Whiting's appeal to prima facie semantic norms.
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how they may be applied. For, the problem with construing the normativeequivalent of the platitude in terms of positive 'ought's is that it contravenes theprinciple that 'ought' implies 'can'. That is, if we take (C) to imply,
(P) w means F —› (x) (S ought to (apply w to x) ‹—› x is f)
then, as Hattiangadi (2006, p. 227) rightly points out, we would be obliged to, say,apply 'dog' to all dogs. That, we cannot do, simply because it is possible, indeedhighly probable, that we won't ever come across or think of all the dogs that thereare, and so cannot apply 'dog' to each and every instance in which it is true to do so.As a consequence, Whiting (2007, p.137) promoted the following principle that hehas now withdrawn:
(P*) w means F —› (x) (S ought to (apply w to x) —› x is f)
The problem with this being that this fails to adequately capture what theNormativist wants to say about cases in which x is not f. For, wrongly, (P*)recommends that it is not the case that we ought to use w of those things that are f,instead of recommending that we ought not to use w of those things that are f. Thus,according to (P*) it is not the case that one ought to apply 'cat' to a dog. But, it doesnot say, as it should, that we ought not to apply 'cat' to a dog. Whiting (2009, p. 544)acknowledges this as a significant defect of (P*).
Thus, Whiting has alighted on the two principles ((P') and (P'')) that we have alreadyseen. Yet, despite such tweaking, there still seems to be a problem with just whatsuch principles deem to be normatively correct and incorrect. Such principles stillseem to tell us that we ought not or may express truth. And even with theirweakened form, it simply does not seem to hold true that meaning requires us to do
that. For, if it is true, say that if 'dog' means dog we ought not to apply 'dog' to thosethings that are not dogs, then just because of what a word means, we arenormatively obliged to use it so as not to express a falsehood. But, to reiterate, justby talking falsely, or maybe even metaphorically, it seems extreme to say that wehave talked improperly. We have seen how Whiting's insistence that the norms ofmeaning are prima facie norms was meant to neutralise this intuition, but I found
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that move, nonetheless, at best unsatisfactory.
So, it seems to me that the stumbling block for the Normativist is the formation ofthe meaning 'platitude' which is accepted; it is from the acceptance of (C) that theseproblems arise. For, though I find nothing wrong with the formulations that Whitinghas come up with, I find it compelling to think that they are statements that mustonly feature in hypothetical imperatives. That is because they are statements as tohow to further the end of speaking truth. That is, for all Whiting's insistence about'correct' being a normative notion, he has not settled to the question as to whether itis normative with regards to meaning; for all he has said, there is nothing that speaksagainst the idea that 'correct' and 'is true' cannot always be substituted for oneanother. Thus, the right hand sided of the bi-conditionals as they feature (P') and(P'') hold when w is used to speak truth instead of just by w meaning what it does.
The Ambiguities of 'Correct Use'
To recap, we have the idea that there are correctness conditions for meaningfulexpressions. Such correctness conditions govern applications of terms. Applicationsof terms are hence deemed to be correct or incorrect. For Whiting, suchapplications, so deemed, are equivalent to the satisfaction of certain normativeconstraints on the application of those terms – that is, normative constraints thathold in virtue of the term's meaning. In applying a term correctly, one has done whatone ought to; in incorrectly applying a term one has done as one ought not to etc.The Normativist and the non-Normativist, need not be in total disagreement. But,what they do disagree about is where these norms come from – that is, in virtue ofwhat, ought an agent do what they ought to in applying the terms in the way thatthey do. But, as we have seen, one of the problems with Whiting's arguments is thathe tries to make a formulation of the meaning platitude ((C)) entail normativetruths, despite the apparent contingency of the normative force on a contingent endof speaking. Despite his efforts, then, normative truths that can be extracted from(C) are still best construed as being means to contingent ends, which are onlynormatively constrained in the manner in which any other hypothetical imperativesnormatively constrain. Thus, such correctness, if indicative of whether such endshave been achieved by such means, cannot be thought to be indicative of the intrinsic
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normativity of meaning.
So, given that semantic correctness as set out (C) is tied to truth, and that isinherently problematic for the Normativist, perhaps they should seek to find anotherunderstanding of the conditions for correctness of expressions that allows them tobe meaningful. Here is a formulation that seems to me to be neutral on the point ofjust what the criterion for semantic correctness really consists in:
(C') w means F —› (x)(S uses w correctly in c ‹—› w can be used to f (in c))
Where w is a word (or indeed, in all likelihood, a sentence), S is a participant in theL-practice and f is an action for which w can be used to perform (in the relevantcontext, c). In order to get intrinsic normativity into the picture with regards to
meaning, then, it appears that 'f's will have to be the sort of actions that onlylanguage use (participating in the L-practice) can enable one to perform; one canonly f in the L-practice. That further proviso is required if the normativity thesis isto be retained because without it the normativity couldn't be associated withmeaning itself. Thus, (C') will allow for that possibility because it allows that thereare certain ends enabled by being a participant, and, as such, in order to do what oneis thus enabled to do, one ought to act in certain ways – specifically, act according tothe rules of the individual circumstances in which the L-practice is active.10
I take it that (C') can be understood, prima facie, as weaker than (C). At the veryleast, it seems to be able to encompass many more types of utterances than justthose that purport to be true. That is just because not all meaningful terms can be'applied' in the senses that Hattiangadi specifies, though they are, nonetheless,meaningful. After all, one should expect a platitude about meaning to be able toencompass all meaningful expressions, rather than a subset of them.11 That is
10One may think, therefore, that the normativity in question here is now of a kind that is dependent oncertain contingent aims, and thus means that the only relevant 'oughts' that can be derived frommeaning claims are of the kind that feature in hypothetical imperatives. But, as I indicated in chapter 1(pp. 23 – 30), though the norms have instrumental value, they are nonetheless instrinisic to the L-practice, because they can be derived from the rules that govern it, and these rules can be regarded asthe facts of meaning.
11Given the wider scope of (C'), if one satisfies (C), then one has satisfied (C'). However, as I intend it tobe understood, it is left open whether it is the case that in satisfying (C'), one has satisfied (C). Irecognise that there is indeed a sense in which 'using w correctly to f' just is the same as 'correctly
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because (C') crucially leaves it open just what the role of truth is in language. Wesaw that the justification given by Hattiangadi (with which Whiting agrees (2007, p.134)) for thinking that (C) is true is that it allows for mere noise to be distinguishedfrom genuine linguistic (meaningful) expression. But, it is not clear that (C) is reallyconstitutive of this distinction. For, as I have suggested, it would appear that (C)really is only a condition on meaningful assertion, or, perhaps, utterances thatpurport to be true.
So, it should be noted that f in (C'), in order to be neutral, cannot be understood to bethat feature in virtue of which w applies. If it is a feature in virtue of which w applies,then it can plausibly be thought to be a feature in virtue of which w is true. But, I say,such a feature is not obviously constitutive of all meaningful terms and expressions.Instead perhaps we can take f to be that feature in virtue of which it is correct to use
w in that circumstance. That may, in the end, be the same as the feature in virtue ofwhich w applies, if it turns out that the normative implications of word's meaningsturn on issues like whether they are used truly. But (C') also allows for the variationnecessary for different kinds of uses speakers can make of terms according tocontext, which (C) does not. Thus, performatives such as 'sorry' can beaccommodated, such that if 'sorry' means sorry, then one correctly uses 'sorry' forapologising in a circumstance iff 'sorry' can be used to apologise in that context (and,apologising in that way can only be achieved by using language, i.e. participating inthe L-pracitice). Likewise, terms such as 'hurrah' – that is, purely expressive words –can be equally well treated ('hurrah' used in a context to express approval, forexample), as well as the sorts of applications of terms (predicates, names) indeclarative expressions that were the concern of (C) ('green' used in a context todescribe the colour of, say, leaves).12
So, the dialectical situation is that the non-Normativist is trying to cast doubt on theclaim that the notion of semantic correctness has immediate and intrinsic normativeimplications. Thus, the idea that there is a platitude about meaning that one can failto satisfy and still succeed in meaning something – indeed even meaning what one
applying w to x' – that appears to be the sort of understanding of 'use' that Boghossian picked up on –yet, it seems intuitively plausible that one can use a term correctly while failing to apply it correctly.More detail on this follows.
12For more detail see pp.70 – 6
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said – is not in opposition to that non-Normativist claim. It may therefore seem thatstressing the questionable nature of the platitude backs that point. On the otherhand, given that a separation can be made between success according to theplatitude and success in meaning should indicate that the platitude is not a platitudeof meaning, whatever else it might be. As a result, there is logical space available forthe thought that success in meaning (use) can be contrasted to success inapplication. Such a contrast would be indicative of the way things are if it could beshown that there is a notion of correctness that applies to expressions that do notsucceed in expressing truth. If such a notion of correctness is not on offer, then theconclusion quickly follows that there is nothing intrinsically normative to meaning,since success in meaning can be dependent on the contingent aim of, for example,saying something true. I take it, though, that there is such a distinct notion to befound.
More specifically, on one understanding of what correctness conditions are meant tobe, one can see why Hattiangadi takes the platitude to express something about thetruth (or something very close to truth) of our linguistic expressions. Though, justbecause correct application can plausibly be thought to be instrumental in value insuch a way as to be indicative of the mere governance of a hypothetical imperative, itdoes not follow that the Normativity Thesis is thereby refuted. The idea of 'correctuse' is one that is, at best, ambiguous. Alan Millar identifies one such ambiguity:
With use understood to be application, correct use, naturally, is taken to be true or warrantedapplication. But this is not the only way to characterize correct use. Another way is to say that a use ofan expression is correct if and only if it is in accordance with ... the meaning of the expression. (Millar2002, p. 59)
There is certainly something in Millar's distinction. I will, later, show how theNormativist can take up what Millar says here, but perhaps not in the way that Millardoes. The distinction I have been stressing is between the notions of correctapplication and correct use. Millar notes that there is, additionally, the related ideaof there being rules governing use. Taking up this idea, the conditions for correctuse can be understood just as those requirements as set out by the rules governinguse; if one has followed such a rule, one has satisfied at least one condition forcorrect use. And thus, at least in one respect, one has used the term correctly.
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As it turns out, what the rules of use require, for Millar, is satisfaction of theconditions for correct application. This I reject, and in due course I will say why, butthere are more immediate issues that press Millar's thought. One such is expressedby Hattiangadi:
The only clear cases in which an utterance is correct in every respect are those in which all the words insentence are used correctly, i.e., when the sentence is true (Hattiangadi 2010, p. 92)
Hattiangadi is surely right here. It is a point that echoes one that was raised byBoghossian that 'correct' in certain contexts can just be seen to stand in for 'is true'.For it is surely right that 'correct' and 'is true', for some specific uses of language,cannot be separated – namely those uses for which it matters that one sayssomething that is true. And, of course, it is according to why it so matters that non-Normativists derive the hypothetical norms that they seek. Hence, if there is to be alegitimate sense in which there is semantic correctness, as here understood, that isnot tied to truth (which, in any case, would not seem to be specifically semantic),then there must be a way of understanding the rules governing use can be satisfiedwhich is not just that some truth has been expressed. I have argued, at least, thatthat cannot be done using the notion of the correct applications of terms.
Thus, the challenge now is to offer a more fine grained description of whatconstitutes correct use in contrast to the correct application of terms. And even inwhat Hattiangadi says, there is room for manoeuvre. For, nothing in the quotationfrom Hattiangadi suggests that utterances can be correct if they are not true – onlythat true utterances can often be thought to be clearly correct. But there are anumber of elements that will make that so. Simply relying on truth as the relevantstandard would be imprudent – especially for the Normativist. This is why:remember that the platitude, minimally, said that meaningful expressionspossess conditions for correct application. It was deemed to be a platitude onthe basis of the idea that without any conditions for correct application, thesounds we make would not be an instance of language use. But, an expressioncan fail to satisfy such conditions and still be meaningful. Indeed, much of the non-Normativist argument relies on this. So, that should only go to show that it is
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questionable whether (C) really does capture a platitude about meaning.
But, on the other hand, it is only on the basis of this formulation that the non-Normativist is able to deny that there is intrinsic meaning normativity, because it isonly on the basis of the stronger formulation that the the contingent instrumentallydistinctive of hypothetical norms appears to be constitutive of expression's meaning.So, I agree with the non-Normativist that this formulation, if it were true, would notlead to intrinsic meaning normativity. However, I will argue that that formulation isfalse – at least it is not a platitude about meaning.
Instead, I suggest, that any platitude about meaning which invokes the notion ofconditions for correctness must just imply that the satisfaction of such conditionsresults in meaningfulness. Thus, just in virtue of some expression being meaningful,some conditions for correctness have been satisfied. And, on one understanding ofwhat the conditions for correct use are, such conditions will be just those that resultin meaningfulness and can be taken as indicative of intrinsic normativity. As such,the stronger formulation of the platitude ((C)) is not a condition on meaning. It israther a condition on what we can do with something with meaning – or better yet, acondition on the sort of action enabled by participating in the L-practice, namelyassertion or perhaps description.
In other words, conditions for correct application are satisfied for specific uses ofterms, by which time the conditions of correct use of those terms can be thought tohave been antecedently satisfied. (C) would only be a platitude according to apresupposition that we have a concern with truth every time we talk. But, clearly,such a presupposition is false as the non-Normativist arguments show. As such, theplatitude, so construed does not have the immediate normative consequences thatWhiting reads into it. However, that says nothing as to whether the platitudeconstrued, as I think it should be, using the notion of the correct use of termsunderstood as acting as in accord with the rules that govern use.
So, the ground has been cleared such that there may be a distinct notion of correctuse as opposed to correct application. I have not, as yet, though, specified just howthis is to be understood other than with reference to some unspecified 'rules of use'
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that are going to set such conditions. In the next Chapter, then, I'll try and fill thatground according to the idea that language use is a practice, and the rules of use arethe constitutive rules of that practice. Thus, the facts of meaning will be understoodas just the requirements of such rules and as such can be thought to have normativecontent. If such a picture of language use is plausible, then we will have a picture oflanguage for which it is true that meaning is intrinsically normative.
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Chapter 3: The Rules of Use
This chapter expands on the proposal sketched at the end of Chapter 1 and showshow it is able to avoid the problems for Normativism that were raised in Chapter 2,as well as some further problems that are raised here.
I first discuss a construal of the criterion for semantic correctness that is ties(semantic) success to speaking truth, and shows how this is a natural formulationgiven the assumption that meaningful expressions must have conditions for correctapplication. We saw in chapter 2 that this idea, so far as the Normativitst isconcerned, is unsatisfactory, and so any such notion of semantic correctness that isdependent on it will be flawed. I then set out some independent reasons for thinkingthat semantic correctness should not be understood in terms of speaking truth, anddemonstrate the ideas' inability to successfully account for 'Travis' examples inwhich the truth-value of utterances of the same sentence is said to vary acrosscontexts.
I then introduce, in more detail, Alan Millar's version of Normativism which itselfrelies on the idea, discussed in Chapter 1, that language use can be understoodprimarily as a practice. I discuss some problems for the view – particularly thoseraised recently by Hattiangadi (2010). However, I think that Normativism can holdfast against such objections, though not as it stands according to Millar. I take thelessons from areas that have been traditional concern of debates surroundingsemantic contextualism – particularly with regard to accommodating Travisexamples – to show how a couple of variations on Millar's Normativism can, to agreater or lesser level of success, deal with the objections lodged against Millar'sown version, and the version of Normativism that's discussed in Chapter 2.
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Truth as an Instrumental Value
The route to the Normativity Thesis that we have seen thus far in Whiting is to havetaken as a platitude the idea that meaningful expressions have conditions for correctapplication, and attempt to derive meaning norms from an understanding of thecorrectness conditions that meaningful expressions are said to possess. Oneproblem with this approach is that we are forced to look at correctness conditionsfor particular types of utterances. Namely, those kinds of utterance that purport toexpress truth. For, given the importance afforded to the notion of correct
application, I have argued, such contingency takes the form of a desire or intention tospeak truth – that is, truth is the notion that semantic correctness is reduced to.Indeed, we have already seen that Hattiangadi takes the Normativist to becommitted to this. After all, 'the only clear cases in which an utterance is correct inevery respect ... [are those in which] ... the sentence is true.' (Hattiangadi 2010, p.92). As a consequence, she takes the Normativist to be committed to N as a criterionfor semantic correctness:
N: u of s is correct if and only if s is true
Where 'u' is a token utterance and 's' is some sentence. If N really is the criterion forsemantic correctness that the Normativist is committed to, then the non-Normativistinsistence that the only normative commitments of language users are those that arenormative requirements of hypothetical imperatives seems plausible. That is justbecause speaking truth is itself a contingent goal of language users, so semanticcorrectness, so understood, will be simply instrumental in achieving that goal.
It should be clear, though, that the Normativist need be committed to no such thing.Indeed, Hattiangadi's justification for the Normativist holding N in the first place ishardly going to be one that the Normativist will want to hold. For even though trueutterances may, in some circumstances, be clear cases of being correct in therelevant senses, that by no means warrants the idea that the logical relation betweentrue utterances and semantically correct utterances is bi-conditional as indicated inN. In fairness, Hattiangadi's report of Normativist commitments to N (and there are
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those who are so committed) is qualified. She is aware that Normativists don't wantthere to be an identity relation between 'semantically correct' and 'true' (seeWhiting's use of Rosen's distinction between 'correctness' and 'correct-makingfeatures' as discussed in Chapter 2), but rather that N indicates that uttering a truestatement makes it correct (Hattiangadi 2010, p. 92). In any case, we have seen thatHattiangadi takes it that semantic correctness is, and must be, of merelyinstrumental value to achieving some contingent goal. That goal is expressing truth,which is not a necessary condition for being meaningful. Normativists signing up toN is consistent with that claim. However, I contend that that is but one way theNormativist can go. Indeed, there is reason for thinking that this is not the way thatthey should.
Contextualist Considerations 1: Austin and Strawson On Truth
Now, given the problems it causes for the Normativist, one should think that theywould be inclined not to see truth and semantic correctness as so linked. However,Hattiangadi (2010) aligns them with semantic minimalists, who take meaning ofwords and sentences just to be the conditions under which they are true. More onthis later, but given the dependence of meaning norms on truth seems to lead to theconclusion that semantic correctness is instrumentally valuable to the fulfilment ofthe desire to speak truth, perhaps the Normativist would be better to look at theoptions as to separate the notion of meaning from truth (with regards to semanticcorrectness, at least). For, if meaning were so understood, it would appearunavoidable that semantic correctness be, in turn, understood in such terms. That isjust because meaning will set the standards for semantic correctness – what a termmeans will be defined by its conditions for semantic correctness (that is just anotherway of expressing thought behind the meaning platitude discussed in the lastchapter).
So, if it can be argued that truth is not the fundamental notion through whichmeaning is understood, one can allow speaking truth to be instrumentally valuablein the relevant sense, but insist that that fact, of itself, says nothing as to thenormative implications of words and sentences meaning what they do. And there issome precedent for this. In his Sense and Sensibilia J. L. Austin (by no means
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uncontroversially) puts forward the idea that,
The question of truth and falsehood does not turn only on what a sentence is, nor yet on what it means,but on, speaking very broadly, the circumstances in which it is uttered. Sentences are not as such eithertrue or false (Austin 1962, pp. 110–11)
There is some terminology to introduce from Austin that will prove useful. On theone hand we have sentences and on the other we have statements. Austin tells usthat,
Statements are made, sentences or words are used. (Austin 1950, p. 114)
Thus sentences are used to make statements; sentences are thought of as thevehicles through which things can be said to be one way or another, thoughsentences themselves, as they stand, say nothing to be any way. It is, therefore,
statements that are deemed to be able to be true or false. That is just because it isonly with statements that anything can really be thought to be said to be some way –and something has to be said to be some way before it can be deemed true (or false)that things are the way as said. That is to say that statements are the grammaticalsubjects of "true" (Strawson 1950, p. 129), and, as such, we can regard a sentence asthat with which a speaker makes a statement. With that distinction in view, Austinelaborates:
A statement is made and its making is an historic event, the utterance by a certain speaker or writer ofcertain words (a sentence) to an audience with reference to an historic situation, event or whatnot.(Austin 1950, pp. 119–20)
Famously, it was on the subject of truth that Austin talked in a symposium in 1950,and there found an adversary in P. F. Strawson. For the purposes of the present, it isin particular with what Austin takes as truth-bearer that Strawson takes especialexception – the idea that is manifest in Austin's contention that statements are'historic events' (and thus able to be true or false).
Strawson contends that, whenever one talks about meaning (i.e. when one sayssomething like x means y) one is talking about sentences (Strawson 1949, p. 84).
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Taking that idea seriously, a consequence of it may be that in talking about meaning,one therefore says something about the sentence – that is one's subject – not justabout what one would be talking about in using that sentence. In the secondinstance, we have something different to deal with – what Austin and Strawsoncalled (though with different bite) statements. The point being that this distinctioncan give substance to the claim that the relevant ends that can plausibly thought tofeature in nothing more than hypothetical imperatives (such as those governingbelief aiming at truth) may well apply to statements but not sentences. Now,Strawson accepts the stipulation that 'statements' are the grammatical subjects of'true'. But, given he disagrees with Austin as to what it is that can be true, thequestion therefore becomes, what are 'statements' (that is, what is the nature ofthese grammatical subjects of 'true')?
He sees Austin as saying that it is only 'speech episodes' that can be true, given thatthis is Austin's understanding (at least in part) of the notion of a statement, and it isstatements that are the grammatical subjects of 'true'. Strawson, however, points outthat though Austin is right that the same sentence can be used to make differentstatements,13 the converse also holds – the same statement can surely be made withdifferent sentences, on different occasions, as in the case with sentences that featureindexicals (which even have a different meaning, so far as Strawson is concerned).But if that is so, how are we to make sense of the idea that the statement made is atrue one, but also that any token statement is tied to one particular speech episode?
Strawson thus is proposing that we take this part of English grammar seriously, andtake statements to be, more or less, what we may currently want to call propositions.He allows that same sentence can express different propositions on differentoccasions, and that the same proposition can be expressed by different sentences ondifferent occasions. This is precisely the picture Austin rejects, thus the debate isessentially over what we should take to be the fundamental truth bearers inlanguage (Travis 2008, p. 5).
13This gives an indication of what kind of normativity will eventually be tied intrinsically to meaning.The facts of meaning will set what the possibilities are for performing different speech-acts withdifferent words and sentences. The making of different statements with the same sentence is aspecial case of acting in accord with the rules that require only certain things be expressed by usesof sentences on different occasions. For more detail see pp. 69 – 76.
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As to whether Austin or Strawson is right (if, indeed, either are), I won't venture tocomment. The point of introducing this debate is simply that these considerationsabout when something would be true, it seems to me, offers an alternative to N forwhat we may think a criterion for semantic correctness is going to be. Morespecifically, I contend, it will give the Normativist a way of combating non-Normativist arguments. Of course, though, this combat will be predicated on somesignificantly controversial claims about the nature of truth. Such controversy aside,here, in brief, is the thought (more detail will be forthcoming): when talking ofmeaning, one is at least talking of sentences. When one appeals to truth as astandard of correctness, or success, one is, in addition, taking of statements. Butthere is reason for thinking that, in this kind of framework, the norms governingsentences and the norms governing statements are distinct. Thus semanticcorrectness in isolation is going to be a notion that will only apply to sentences.
I will try and presently draw this out further by invoking examples that Travis hasoften relied upon in which it is, supposedly, fixed what the meaning of a singlesentence is, and what is being talked about (the world), but given a change incontext, the truth-value of two utterances of that sentence can vary. If that is so, thenwe have reason for thinking that truth may not be the measure of semantic success.I then go on to offer a way of thinking about the role that meaning has to play in suchexamples that can give support to the idea that there are certain norms governing itthat are additional to any that may be governing expressions of truth, and,furthermore, that these are intrinsic to meaning.
Contextualist Considerations 2: Travis Examples
The debate between Austin and Strawson, and Travis' subsequent interpretation,indicates a different way of viewing what the 'normativity of meaning' amounts to.According to that debate, one may come up with different ways in which suchnormativity is manifest – one 'Strawsonian', one 'Austinian'. For what its worth, mysympathies lie with the 'Austinian' route. But that notwithstanding, I will attempt toshow that as a proposal, such a route is able to allow for that which Normativismwould have to. To get us going as to how, first take this from Travis, which is anelaboration, as he sees it, on the Austinian thought that truth and falsity does not
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turn on the meaning of sentences:
What words mean plays a role in fixing when they would be true; but not an exhaustive one. Meaningleaves room for variation in truth conditions from one speaking to another. What that non-exhaustiverole is depends on what it is to have said what is true. (Travis 1996, p.94)
The first idea of note is that meaning 'plays a role in fixing when [words] would betrue; but not an exhaustive one.' We have seen that there is a fundamental differencebetween what Strawson and Austin take to be the bearers of truth. That differencehas the following consequence: on one understanding of what Strawson is up to, theultimate notion of semantic correctness is one to do with truth; from what Austin'sperspective there is a distinct notion of correct use that is independent of anyconcerns about truth. These different conceptions of truth bearers can therefore canbe taken to say different things as to the normative implications of facts of meaning –of how, given what they mean, we can understand the idea that we should use termsin the ways we ought to.
I will now offer some independent reason for thinking that the Austinian conceptionof the relation between truth and meaning is worth consideration (that is,independent of the current debate over meaning's normativity), by showing,following Travis, that there are certain cases of when things are true and false forwhich the Austinian framework is best suited. And given that what somethingmeans sets the standards for semantic correctness, if meaning is not to be thought ofas truth conditions, as the 'Austinian' picture would suggest, then semanticcorrectness too cannot be understood in terms of truth. Thus, under this kind of'Austinian' framework, we can think that the norms governing some of our uses oflanguage that can rightly be thought to be indicative of how certain contingent endsmay be satisfied, such as those, perhaps, of informing or lying, are thus understoodas acting upon those who make statements, in their so making of them.Furthermore, such a framework can accept that the sorts of norms that so governsuch acts are normative requirements of hypothetical imperatives for the sorts ofreasons cited by the non-Normativist. That is because such a picture can allow forthe appropriate kind of instrumental value in correctness if the domain is restrictedto the conditions for correctness in making statements. However, if this kind ofsystem is going to be consistent with Normativism, it will have to be the case that
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nonetheless there are meaning norms in addition to the kinds just cited which aretaken to govern the making of statements. I think that a natural way to do this is tothink that there are distinctive norms governing sentences, as well as thosegoverning uses we make of them. As to what about sentences these norms can bethought to govern, I will elaborate on in time.
So, to take this option, the Normativist will have to give reason for thinking thatthere are norms over and above those that govern statements as here understood.Once that that is shown, it will then be required that it be shown that theseadditional norms are such that they can legitimately be thought to be intrinsic tomeaning. This is what I will attempt. To do so, though, first let's return to themeaning platitude. The platitude was meant to specify a condition on expressionsfor their meaningfulness. Therefore, if the distinction as made above between whatis to be thought of as applying to meaning, and so sentences, and what is to apply to(something like) truth and so to statements too, the stronger formulation of theplatitude will at least be dealing with properties of statements rather than those ofsentences alone. Given the present concerns, one thought is that the strongerformulation ((C) – see p. 34) cannot be said to be a condition on meaning alonebecause it relates to statements as opposed to sentences. Thus, the weakerformulation must speak to, or rather about, sentences alone, if it is to beincontrovertibly about meaning. It must allow for that which (only) meaning andsentences allow for. What that is can be demonstrated by way of appeal to so-calledTravis examples:
Pia's Japanese maple is full of russet leaves. Believing that green is the colour of leaves, she paintsthem. Returning, she reports, 'That's better. The leaves are green now.' She speaks truth. A botanistfriend then phones, seeking green leaves for a study of green-leaf chemistry. 'The leaves (on my tree)are green,' Pia says. 'You can have those.' But now Pia speaks falsehood. (Travis 1997, p.111)
The thrust of the Travis example is a point about truth. It has a bearing on the ideaof the correctness of language use at least in so far as it offers us reason to think thatthe notion of correctness is not fixed to truth, or indeed, anything like it.14 For, in sofar as the semantics are concerned, it may, prima facie, seem odd to say Pia has done
14As I hope to show, that is not all that I think that the Travis examples can show in the present context.On what more the Travis can provide, see pp. 69 – 76.
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something wrong with her second utterance. After all, moments before, she usedthe same sentence and she spoke truly about the colour of the leaves – as theexample stipulates, neither the semantics (the meaning) of the sentence uttered, northe world has changed.15 She just spoke falsely – she said that the leaves weregreen in a context in which they didn't count as green. She only did somethingwrong if it matters whether she spoke truth. But it may not. In any case, she spoke
meaningfully. The point being that the meaning of 'green', plausibly, stayed the same(as did what she spoke about), while the truth-values varied. That goes to show thatwe may have reason to doubt the claim that the only norm in the vicinity of meaningin such cases is one that concerns truth. So, that may give us reason to think that itmight not be truth that is the standard of correctness that meaning latches onto.
Bringing this back to the issues of present interest, remember that the non-Normativist wants to show that the Normativist cannot rely on truth as an intrinsicnormative constraint on meaning as it is not always the standard against which anymeaningful expression should be judged to be correct or incorrect. Travis examples,therefore, can be taken to back up that point. But, just because truth may not be therelevant notion, it does not follow that there isn't a notion of semantic correctness atall – and importantly, it does not follow that the relevant notion is not indicative ofthe intrinsic normativity of meaning. If these kinds of examples can allow for that,then they may offer us reason for thinking that the reductive agenda of identifyingsemantic correctness as dependent on contingent desires of language users fails. Todo so, Normativists must provide a reason for thinking that we should not, therefore,understand semantic correctness in terms of truth – that is, this is reason to thinkthat there is a notion of semantic correctness that is not so tied to the notion oftruth; that semantic correctness is at work regardless of whether any givenutterance of an sentence is true. If that is so, it matters not when, for example,Boghossian tells us that sometimes 'correct' can just mean 'true', because that it notthe relevant notion of semantic correctness. That's just because it need not be thecase that once the value of truth is ruled out of supporting the Normativity Thesis,
15The reason for thinking that the semantics has not changed can be demonstrated if we think of thefollowing example. Take it that Pia's botanist and photographer friends come to see her at the sametime, both asking for green leaves. She then steps into the adjoining room, paints her leaves andutters, “The leaves are green. You can have those.” For one of her friends it is still true that theleaves are green, for the other it is not. But, Pia only produced one utterance. Thus, it appears oddhow the semantics can change within the same utterance of the same sentence.
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there is not some other semantic standard that does support it.
Semantic Correctness: If not Truth, then what?
The problem now facing us is that if, for the sake of argument, it was accepted thattruth isn't the appropriate grounding for the notion of semantic correctness (for thereasons that Austin and Travis give), what could be such a ground so as to still beconsistent with the central tenants of Normativism?
Travis seems to give us a clue as to how that might be answered:
Meaning fixes something words would do (and say) wherever spoken meaning what they do;something they are for, so also something about what they ought to do. ...Roughly, [the words 'is round']are for describing round things ... that is what they ought to be used for. (Travis 1996, p. 96; myemphasis)
And again,
What words mean imposes a condition on their saying, on a speaking, what is so. Different occasionsimpose different standards for satisfying that condition. Something about what truth is makesoccasions matter to such standards. (Ibid, pp. 102 - 3)
What Travis says here indicates one way in which one can take the notion ofcorrectness with regards to our particular utterances to appear to have nothing to dowith specific meaning norms (though, I hasten to add, I attribute no such move toTravis himself). For once it is fixed as to just what terms speak of according to theoccasion in which they are spoken, it is truth that becomes of primary concern. But,before it is fixed, before the statement is made, there is a question as to what can be
used to make it. The thought is that there is something about meaning that tells uswhat it is that may (or ought (not) to) be used to make it. Thus, this is one way inwhich one can regard meaning as having a role to play in constraining what could
count as saying something truly on a given occasion. And how things so count can betaken to have significant normative implications.
So far as Travis is concerned, meaning's role in truth, though important, is in need ofsupplement; meaning on its own cannot get to truth (one cannot say, for example,
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what statement (description) has been made, by looking to the meaning of somesentence alone). Thus, the norms governing meaning will not be as demanding assome Normativists may have supposed. At the very least, they won't demand thatanything be true, because meaning cannot get us that far. Hence, the idea that wecan still speak correctly even if we speak falsely (in the case of deliberate deception,say) can be accommodated for – it would be a position which would allow forcorrectly speaking falsely, but we will also be in a position to hold on to the idea thatmeaning is intrinsically normative. We, therefore, need some idea as to howconditions for correct use could apply to a false statement – that is, have someconception of what it would be to use words correctly regardless of whether onespoke truth, and that such correctness is indicative of normative truths aboutmeaning. If that is to be achieved, then any 'ought's that populate distinctivelysemantic vocabulary cannot be understood in the same kind of way that Whiting'sshould be. In other words, correctness and truth must be viewed as entirelyseparable, and the correctness that is to be properly attributed to meaning can beseen to have direct normative implications.
It should be noted at this point that I do not pretend to be expounding Travis' ownview. Instead, I am taking some of Travis' conclusions and arguments about thenature of truth, and transferring them into the debate at hand. I think that theseobservations can best be seen to support a form of Normativism if they areincorporated into some aspects of Alan Millar's position that can also be called'Normativist'. But as will become clear, this will not be entirely faithful to Millar'sposition either. Thus the Normativism that I propose as unaffected by the non-Normativist arguments here discussed is not a position that I attribute to eitherprotagonist.
Use In Accordance With Meaning: Alan Millar's Normativism
As we have seen in previous chapters, many aspects of the sort of Normativism that Ihave been propounding are not without precedent. Alan Millar has presentedsimilar thoughts. However, the view I will here be offering for consideration differsin some important respects. These will be drawn out in Hattiangadi's response toMillar's arguments that meaning is intrinsically normative.
60
In contrast to Whiting's attempt to derive normative truths from claims about thecorrect application of terms, Millar favours a formulation that makes use of a notionof semantic correctness in terms of using words in accord with their meaning. Thatis an idea we have already seen – it is arguably the idea that Kripke first put forward,and then deemed impossible to satisfy. The idea is this: we can get normative truthsout of claims about meaning if, instead of concentrating on just what the languageuser does with their expressions, we concentrate on the idea that language use is apractice.
This is an idea that I discussed at the end of Chapter 1. There, recall, I said that thecontingency of language use on broad desires to communicate may not leadunavoidably to the conclusion that any norms of meaning must be instrumental inthe way that the 'ought's that feature in hypothetical imperatives are. Such aconsequence can be avoided if we regard language use or communication as apractice. Thus, with the right notion of practice at work, and language useunderstood as a practice, then normative truths can plausibly be thought to followfrom facts about meaning – so long as they are understood as the requirements ofthe rules that govern (constitute) such a practice. Of course, the everyday notion of apractice is not precise enough to stand as a notion on its own in the present context.As I mentioned in the first chapter, I am happy to follow Alan Millar when he saysthat a practice is an essentially rule-governed activity. (Millar 2004, p. 85) Thatmeans that normativity is part and parcel of the notion of a practice – one can't beparticipating in a practice if there is nothing one ought (not) or may (not) do:
To participate in a practice is to incur a commitment to following its governing rules because theactivity in which one engages, in virtue of participating, is the activity of doing the things the rulesprescribe. (Ibid, pp. 85 - 6)
Now, Millar takes the objection that Boghossian articulated against Normativistswith the thought that, in certain contexts, 'correct' could just mean 'true', to beidentifying the use of terms with their (true) application (Ibid, p. 160). He thinks,though, that instead of understanding the notion of correctness in terms of trueapplication, that we should understand semantic correctness in terms of thesatisfaction of the conditions for true application. What is the difference? What
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Millar wants to allow for is not only the idea that (in some circumstances) anutterance of a falsehood can be deemed correct, but conversely that, regardless ofwhether the thing said is true, the utterance can be a case of misuse. A misuse isunderstood as an utterance that fails to satisfy the conditions for correct applicationof the term. Millar offers the following example:
If I thought 'arcane' meant ancient then I would be liable to use the word as if that is what it meant. Inso doing I would fail to respect the conditions for true application of the term; that is, I would be usingthe term as if its conditions for true application were other than they are. (Miller 2004, p. 162)
Notice that there may be cases where one misuses a term, but says something true.Millar shows this by offering an example in which one was to describe a ritual as'arcane', when we intended to express the proposition that the ritual is ancient.Nonetheless, the ritual may, indeed, be arcane. Thus, if that is so, when I utter, "theritual is arcane", have not expressed a falsehood, but I am semantically culpable fornot expressing what I intended to express. In which case the relevant manner ofcomparison is between what proposition I intended to express, and what propositionwas, in fact, expressed by my token utterance.
It seems that there is a sense in which a misuse, as Millar conceives of it, issemantically incorrect in virtue of facts about meaning – whatever one's intention, inorder to express something, there is now a standard against which it can be judgedcorrect or incorrect for each expression. For, it is by way of the standards set by theconditions for correct application, so the thought goes, that we can grasp what it isfor language use (and, I suppose, meaning) to be intrinsically normative. Butbecause he formulates the issues in terms of the conditions for correct application,rather than writing in correct (i.e. true) application itself into his understanding ofthe criterion for correctness of meaning, the issue of whether truth is expressed issupposed to be orthogonal to the issue of whether the expression is semanticallycorrect. Accordingly, misuses (i.e. cases of semantic incorrectness) are cases inwhich, in using a term, one treats it as having conditions of true application that arenot fixed by the meaning of that term (Ibid, p. 163). So a misuse is when one floutsthe rules of the practice, and what those rules require is that one respects theconditions for correct application of the terms involved. With this in mind,Hattiangadi translates Millar's conception of the criterion for semantic correctness
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into the following claim:
N**: An utterance, u, of s is correct if and only if s literally means that p, andthe speaker intends to express p by uttering s. (Hattiangadi 2010, p.103)
The reference to 'literal meaning' that Hattiangadi makes arises because of theguiding slogan of Millar's Normativism: that we ought to 'use terms in accordancewith their meaning'. The way she understands such claims is that there is someproposition that sentences are able to literally express, and to use in accordancewith its meaning, we simply must intend to express the proposition the sentencedoes, in fact, express. As such the 'literal meaning' sets the standards that speakersmust live up to – it is that which we use words in accordance or in conflict with.Thus, Hattiangadi aligns Millar with semantic minimalists. One of their guidingprinciples is the following:
The semantic content of a sentence S is the content that all utterances of S share. (Cappelen and Lepore2005, p. 143)
Where such semantic content is understood as the 'literal meaning' of the sentenceuttered, and literal meaning is understood as the truth conditions of the propositionliterally expressed.
Now, given the preceding discussion of Travis examples, it is not obvious that such areference of 'literal meaning' is going to be satisfactory.16 On the other hand, it isconsistent with all that has been said with regard to such examples that we can stillmake sense of the use of words as in accordance with their meaning – it simply is notdeterminate, independent of context, just when a sentence with such a meaningwould be true. That is, there is no proposition (understood as a priorly determinedtruth bearer) that a sentence can literally express if we take occasion-sensitivityseriously. For, under that proposal truth-conditions (the minimalists' understandingof what meaning is) are only determined in some context on some occasion, and not
16 Of course, minimalists think they can accommodate Travis examples within their framework ofliteral meaning. That being so or not, what I want to explore is whether Travis' solution can helpNormativism, for, it turns out, one that relies on semantic minimalism is flawed.
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before.
But it is unclear, under Millar's present proposal, that conditions for correctapplication can be understood as distinct from truth conditions. Take, again, Millar'sexample of the misuse of 'arcane'. Millar understands the conditions for correctapplication of the term 'arcane' to differ from those of 'ancient'. In what respect canthey be seen to differ? Given that Millar's concern is with the application of terms, itwould just seem to be those conditions under which these terms could be used trulyof something. If so, the contribution that 'arcane' and 'ancient' can make to the truthconditions of sentences in which they can appear to differ. It just so happens that inthe particular case that Millar discusses, it is true that the the ritual in question thatis the subject of the adjective(s) in question, is both arcane and ancient. The misusecan be, perhaps, explained, by the inferences one could make on the back of suchclaims, such that one would be able to infer different claims with different truth
conditions on the back of the first. Thus, having different conditions for correctapplication will be understood just as having different truth conditions.
If this is right, then, as it stands, Millar's 'Normativism' is still consistent with theidea that the norms governing meaning, if understood in the way Millar proposes,are indicative of nothing more than how to achieve some contingent end – namelywhatever end a speaker has in speaking truth on an occasion, or whether truths canbe inferred from what was said. For, semantic correctness will have to be that whichcontributes to expressing truth – truth will still have to be of antecedent concern. Itis a concern, as we have seen, that one need not have in order to be meaningful.
On the other hand, this is but one way in which Millar's underlying thought can bedeveloped. Instead, contra Hattiangadi, I propose that the sorts of ideas of semanticnormativity that Millar puts forward can best be made stable and robust once it ismade compatible with certain semantic contextualist commitments. In order to doso, I propose, we need to understand the criterion of semantic correctnessdifferently, such that it is wedded closer to the notion of the rules governing (that is,constituting) practices. For the connection to literal meaning that Hattiangadiidentifies is a hangover from the fact that Millar takes the best way to understand theconditions of correct use to be indicative of semantic normativity is in terms of uses
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respecting conditions of correct application. And this cannot be the understandingof correct use that plays a part in the modified meaning platitude that I discussed inchapter 2 (see p. 44).
Before discussing this proposal at more length, I want to offer reason for thinkingthat even within the framework of understanding sentences as able to expresspropositions in the sense that they capture 'literal meaning', not all of Hattiangadi'sobjections to Millar's Normativism hold water.
A 'Strawsonian' Version of Millar's Normativism
Hattiangadi takes Millar's proposal to have counter-intuitive consequences. Inparticular, she feels that his version of Normativism (hereafter 'MN') is incapable ofadequately dealing with data that contextualists often rely on to undermine the ideasentences possess a literal meaning understood in terms of truth conditions. I willnot here assess the success of contextualist attempts to do that. However, I proposethat there are at least two ways in which (at least some central aspects of) MN canaccommodate some of the intuitions that contextualists invoke with such examplesthat Hattiangadi feels bears on issues of semantic correctness, of which she takes itthat MN cannot give a satisfactory account. I will presently outline the first way, andshow that it can accommodate that which Hattiangadi feels MN cannot, but comes upagainst its own problems – some of which I will briefly indicate, but chiefly that thisversion still turns out only bogusly to have a claim to be Normativist. This version Iwill call, though without pretending that it has such pedigree as the name suggests,the 'Strawsonian' version of MN. The reason why will become clear shortly.
Take the following sentences that are two examples of a number of types ofsentences contextualists have used to throw down the gauntlet to minimalists andother non-contextualists:
(1) Every bottle is empty (Stanley and Szabó 2000, pp. 219 - 20)
(2) It is raining
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Hattiangadi appeals to these in turn to demonstrate what she feels to be the counter-intuitive consequences of MN. (1) is used in what are called 'Context ShiftingArguments' and (2) is often said to be (semantically) incomplete (with context beinginvoked by contextualists to do the completing). Again, I won't go into too many ofthe details here. The point being that, according to Hattiangadi, our intuitions as towhat these sentences say, or what they are used to say, and what they mean, differfrom what MN will have to deem to be semantically correct:
Suppose I utter (1) with the intention of expressing the proposition that every bottle of alcoholic drink
in the house is empty. This is not what (1) literally means. Hence, my utterance of (1) is incorrect, byMillar's rights. (Hattiangadi 2010, p. 103)
According to Hattiangadi, (1), as it literally means, contains an unrestrictedquantifier, but as used in her example it is restricted. That is, as it stands, (1)predicates 'being empty' of every bottle in existence. In some situation, say the endof a party, when all available alcohol has been drunk, however, (1) would (intuitivelycorrectly) be used to express the proposition, as Hattiangadi suggests, that every
bottle of alcoholic drink in the house is empty. Thus, with such a use of (1) the word'every' has been misused, because it has not been used in accordance with itsmeaning. Similarly for (2). If I said (2), on an occasion in which I am standing in adownpour, it intuitively is used to say that it is raining here and now (Ibid, p. 104).But, once again, under the minimalist analysis, that is not what (2) literally means,despite it being the intuitively correct thing to say in that circumstance. It istherefore in the face of our intuitions as to when it is correct to utter such sentences,that MN says that such a use is a misuse, and thus incorrect.
But, why must (1) and (2) be thought to have but one 'meaning' that any given usecan be thought to be in accordance or in conflict with? Take the 'Strawsonian' (scarequotes) thought that was introduced earlier. Perhaps one can say that sentences like(1) are such that there is a set of statements to be made (correctly) in using them. Ifso, then the literal meaning of such sentences is not some single proposition, but aset of propositions that the sentence can express, given the right circumstances.Hence, given the right relation between circumstance and sentence, some giventoken statement, that expresses one of the propositions of that set, can be said to bethe correct use of that sentence. Thus, one can say that (1) has been used in
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accordance with its meaning because, given the circumstance, that propositionexpressed by the use of that sentence, is a correct statement to make.
On such a picture, instead of N**, we can have something like the following:
N': An utterance, u, of s is correct if and only if s can be used to expressthat {p, q, r ...} in c{1, 2, 3, ...}, and the speaker intends to express that ∂with s and s can be used to express ∂ in cn
Where u is an utterance, s is the sentence that can be used to express one (or more)of the set of propositions, {p, q, r, ...} and c{1, 2, 3, ...} is the set of contexts in which onecan use s to express any given member of that set. Thus, ∂ is some member of thatset and cn is the context in which a u of s expresses just that member of the set.
According to the criterion of semantic correctness as specified by N', contexts playthe role of disambiguation. For example, the criterion of semantic correctnessaccording to N’ for the sentence “every bottle is empty” might be the following:
N’every bottle is empty: An utterance of “every bottle is empty” is correct iff “everybottle is empty” can be used to say, {that every bottle in the house is empty, that
every bottle in the universe is empty, that every bottle in the satchel is empty, …}in a context {at a house party, at the end of the universe, in a desert, …}, and thespeaker intends to express [for example] that every bottle in the house is emptywith “every bottle is empty” and “every bottle is empty” can be used to express
that every bottle in the house is empty in the context at a house party.
So, according to this proposal, Hattiangadi's analysis, if her reading is accurate, isn'tentirely incorrect, it just underestimates the mechanisms that are at the disposal ofMN. That is, by invoking contexts and the possibility of multiple, so-called, 'literalmeanings', many of the counter-intuitive consequences that Hattiangadi identifiescan be removed. For, the objection that MN cannot account for the intuitions wehave about what sentences are the correct ones to use in different situations can beaccommodated for if the propositions that are expressed in those situations can beproperly thought of as members of the set of propositions the sentence can express
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(and the particular context of utterance is the one in which that member of the set isexpressed). The standard against which any given expression can be judged issimply more complex than Hattiangadi took it to be with her original objection.
As a result, for example, we can say that the propositions that it is raining here and
now is a member of the set of propositions that (2) is able to express. It does so inthe context in which it is uttered when it is raining where and when the utterer is.Thus, it is semantically correct to utter (2) in such a context.
But N', and consequently such a version of MN, has its own problems. I shall indicatejust a couple of them. First, there is an explanatory gap in this kind of theory that isakin to challenge Travis raises (2008 pp. 5-6) as to just how such statements are tobe individuated according to Strawson's view of truth-bearers. The challenge arisesaccording to the theory's locating, in effect, an ambiguity in the expressive power ofsentences that must allow for, in principle, disambiguation. More formally, inprinciple, there will be some way of theoretically pairing up propositions to contextssuch that we will be able to specify just what proposition will be true (or correct) injust which context. The theory should be comprised of theorems to the the effectthat an utterance of s in c1 will express proposition p; and utterance of s in c2 willexpress proposition q, etc. That is something that a proponent of such MN will, inprinciple, be able to provide in advance of speaking, and in absence of it, the proposalis weakened. I will not attempt here to prove that the provision of such theorems itis not possible, though I suspect it probably is not.
But, most significantly for the nonce, it isn't clear that such a way of understandingsemantic correctness can answer Hattiangadi's further, and perhaps morefundamental, challenge to Millar's Normativism. We saw that it is questionablewhether Millar's version of Normativism really is a version of Normativism at all; inother words, this kind of claim offers no help in blocking the argument I firstpresented in chapter one:
The correctness of an utterance .. appears to be merely instrumental – uttering a sentence that meansthe proposition that I intend to express by making the utterance is nothing more than a sufficientmeans by which I can satisfy my communicative intention. (Hattiangadi 2010, p. 103)
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The sort of correctness indicated by N' correctness for a speaker's ends incommunicating what she intended to; the thought is that it is contingent what ends Ihave in communicating is such a way as to be the sort of end that could feature as theantecedent of a hypothetical imperative. Now, for Millar, semantic correctness(using words a one ought to) requires that a speaker would adjust how they act oncethey recognise that there is a discrepancy between their use of some expression andthe how that expression behaves within the relevant practice (the standard againstwhich the expression is to be judged). The way in which that end (my'communicative intention') can be satisfied would fit in as the consequent. And thenormative commitment to that consequent could not be detached even if theantecedent were satisfied – even if I did achieve what I set out to in communicatingas I did, it is not the case that I thereby ought to have spoken as to satisfy my desireto so communicate. In other words, if I wanted to express such and such, then if Ifound out that the expression I used does not behave in such a way as to express thatin the practice, then I ought to change my behaviour. But, my changing of behaviouris still dependent on my desire to express what I wanted to. Without that, I have noobligations.
Notice that this is not the same thought as we saw from Alexander Miller in Chapter1 about the intention to communicate tout court, but the intention to communicate
whatever it is that one has communicated – and subsequently what one has intendedto communicate just that, for. That is because of the reference to intention. Therelevant intentions are not just the general intention to say something meaningful –engage in communicating in general – but that my saying something achieves somefurther end – whatever end I had in communicating what I did. The proliferation ofthe propositions a sentence is able to literally express will plainly say nothing to thatpoint, because propositions are just understood as that which the sentence is used to
say. I will now offer expand on the proposal introduced at the end of chapter 1 toshow how it may circumvent the kinds of problems just raised.
An 'Austinian' Version of Millar's Normativism
What seems accommodating about the 'Strawsonian' MN for Millar is, not only can
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the central role of correctness understood as alignment of intended meaning andliteral meaning be preserved, but also that his idea that semantic correctness shouldbe best understood as a satisfaction of the conditions for correct application.However, I have suggested that such a conception is inadequate, and may well endup playing into the hands of the non-Normativist who insists that the norms ofmeaning are nothing more than hypothetical imperatives. Thus, if the notion ofcorrect application is to be purged from the Normativist ranks, then a modifiedversion of MN is needed. I suggest that one interpretation – Travis' – of Austin'sposition in contrast to Strawson can give us a clue as to how to do that.
According to this 'Austinian' conception, however, the notion of semantic correctnesscannot take the same form as either Hattiangadi's description of MN, or the'Strawsonian' MN. For it seems, under this proposal, inappropriate to talk of
semantic correctness with regard to particular statements, so will be in a position toreject the idea that semantic correctness should be understood in terms of theconditions for correct application. Semantic correctness is meant to be indicative ofnorms governing meaning. Such norms, since they govern meaning, will be normsgoverning only sentences, rather than statements (or, for that matter any particularkinds of speech acts qua the speech acts that they are). In particular, they will benorms governing which sentences one can use to make some speech act in a context.But, the idea of understanding such norms in terms of the conditions for applicationinvokes the specific uses that are to be made with sentences – specifically, those usesthat aim at truth. But any norms so understood will invariably be the norms thatgovern the making of statements, which will be dependent on the specific ends thespeaker sought to achieve in making it. Such norms cannot therefore be regarded asgoverning (only) what the sentences in question can be used to say.
This is, at least, one way of interpreting (some aspects of) Travis in the presentcontext. For, meaning, according to Travis, is to be understood as that which confersa semantics. Semantics is understood as those properties words have which aredependent on what words (can) say (Travis 1997, p. 110–11). How we understandwhat 'words can say' indicates here must be done with care, for a central point of'occasion-sensitivity', as Travis sees it, is well-summed up when he says,
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So what [a sentence] says on a speaking, of [for example] given leaves, etc., is not determined by what it,or its parts, mean. (Travis 1997, p. 113)
Thus, the norms I am positing, if consistent with this thought, will be such that whatthey require will not result in sentences saying things to be a way such that whatthey could be true. Indeed, that is required to avoid the problems that beset Millar'sown MN and the Strawsonian version. Nonetheless, obviously, there must beidentifiable norms if they are to be intrinsic to meaning so understood.
With that in mind, I propose that the notion of the conditions for correct use thatfeature in (C') should be understood as the conditions for participating in thepractice of language use. By way of a reminder, the reformulated platitude that Iproposed in chapter 2 was this:
(C') w means F —› (x)(S uses w correctly in c ‹—› w can be used to f (in c))
With this gloss on correctness as relating to meaning, it can be filled out by analtered criterion for semantic correctness that will say that to use a word correctly ofsomething is to follow a rule that governs the L-practice (language use). One way toget a grip on how the rules of such a practice should be understood is if we look tohow Travis conceives of meaning as conferring what sentences can be used to makegiven speech acts. For that is the way in which applications of words and sentences(an action enabled by participating in the L-practice) can be thought to be a specialcase of the kinds of rules governing speech acts, thus semantic correctness forapplications of this sort will amount to what the rules that govern those kinds ofspeech acts require.
What the Travis type cases show is, firstly, that (at least under one explanation ofwhat is going on is such cases), semantic correctness of these kinds of speech actscannot be thought of solely in terms of truth. But, if that is all they show, that saysnothing as to whether whatever the relevant notion for correctness of some speechact is, is one that is indicative of intrinsic normativity of meaning. But, in the presentcontext, that is not all they show. For, the manner in which Travis identifies thedivergence of correctness from truth, we have a notion of what role circumstance
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can have in fixing just what is at stake where semantic correctness is concerned –just what it is that correctness in our speaking depends. The proposal is that thenorms that are intrinsic to meaning need to be derived from the sorts of actions (theends one seeks to achieve) that one is performing in using the language in acircumstance. The rules governing the use of some sentence, for example, will betied to whether it can be used to perform some kind of task for which language is anecessary tool.
Thus the criterion for semantic correctness – that which Millar calls 'using inaccordance with meaning' – will be understood in terms of using an expression inaccordance with the rules governing its use – what those rules require. How aresuch rules to be understood? In terms of what is a permissible 'move' in the L-practice. What counts as a move in the L-practice? Well, just the kind of act thatallows for the achievement of ends that only language use can enable. It is themeaning of words and sentences that sets what the possibilities are for differenttypes of such moves (for achievement of different types of (L-practice enabled)ends). Just what such possibilities they allow for has normative import. They arepossibilities that can be specified by way of the rules that govern how these acts areto be performed in different circumstances—what moves can be made.
So thinking of them will allow space for the idea that it is by following such rules that
enables certain ends that communicators have in communicating to be fulfilled (thiskind of move was already indicated in the reformulation of the meaning platitude).What counts as a permissible move will just be that which can be done in the L-practice that will fulfil those specialised ends of the language user as a language user.As noted, though, indispensable to the achievement of those ends – ends such asspeaking truth (describing/asserting), expressing approval in a particular way,apologising, baptising (broadly construed), etc. – is that one be a participant of thepractice in which such ends are made possible.
In other words, so as to be able to have certain ends – ends that are (only) achievedvia using language, or can only be achieved by participants in the L-practice – thereare certain requirements that need to be met – namely those requirements that arenecessary for one to respect in order to engage in communication. Flouting those
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requirements will therefore not even allow one to be in a position to express, forexample, either truth or falsehood; flouting the requirements does not allowstatements (or for that matter, any other kind of speech-act) to be made at all.
This is importantly distinct from the idea that we should use terms in accordancewith their conditions for correct application. Most obviously, there is no reference to'literal meaning'. That is because the proposal does not take there to be a set ofpropositions, and posit a function from members of that set to circumstance suchthat the correct proposition in context can be specified. Instead, room has beenmade for antecedent conditions to be satisfied so that correct application canhappen at all – conditions of meaningfulness. We should use terms, under thisproposal in accordance with what the rules that govern the sorts of actions that useof them in circumstances require.
So how might a criterion of semantic correctness thus be formulated along theproposed lines? Here is one proposal:
(N''): It is correct to use w to f in c iff there is some rule, R, that isconstitutive of the L-practice, that requires (allows), in c, that w isused to perform act f.
Where w is a word or sentence, f is an action (of a sort to be specified presently), c isa context of utterance of that word or sentence and R is the fact of meaning (the rulegoverning its use) that can be derived from the putative reformulated meaningplatitude—(C').
To illustrate how this might work in practice, it will be useful to see how (N'') might
fail to be satisfied, such that some use of the language is incorrect. It is worth notingthat such concerns need not have any bearing on truth other than the idea thatcertain ways of expressing truth (certain 'f's) are possible (that is, such an action isenabled) only if (N'') is antecedently satisfied.
To do so, here is an example of one such 'R' as derived (a specific instance of) (C').Let's return to 'sorry'. The criterion for semantic correctness for 'sorry' will be
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something like,
(N''sorry): It is correct to use 'sorry' to apologise in c iff there is some rule, Rsorry in
c, that is constitutive of the L-practice, that allows, in c, for 'sorry' tobe used to apologise.
Rsorry in c will be the rule that specifies the conditions under which sorry can becorrectly used in context (on an occasion). That, in effect, will simply be theconsequent of (C') (for the specific case of 'sorry'): one correctly uses 'sorry' forapologising in a circumstance iff 'sorry' can be used to apologise in that context (and,apologising in that way can only be achieved by using language, i.e. participating inthe L-pracitice). Just how that fills out will be dependent on the context in whichthe term (or sentence) is used.
Turning to the Travis examples, we can thus see how they can be accommodatedwhile, at the same time, preserving some notion of the intrinsic normativity ofmeaning (specifically the kind of intrinsic normativity outlined at the end of chapter1). In the context in which we have the botanist asking if the leaves are green, we(approximately) have the following criterion for semantic correctness of 'green':
(N''green): It is correct to use 'green' to describe the colour of leaves in cbotanistiff there is some rule, R (green in c (botanist)), that is constiutive of the L-practice, that allows, in cbotanist for 'green' to be used to describe thecolour of leaves.
Thus the reason that it is incorrect to use green in this context is that it does notdescribe the colour of leaves, but, perhaps the colour of the paint on the surface ofthe leaves. It differs from the thought that semantic correctness is to be understoodin terms of truth because, even though they come to the same verdict as to whetherit is correct to use green to describe the colour of the leaves, it is the rule that has setthe conditions according to the circumstance – the same goes for 'sorry', i.e. if thecircumstance is such that the rule does not allow for 'sorry' to be used to apologise,then using that term, in those circumstances, to do that will be incorrect (one oughtnot to use the term in that way). What it is for a term like 'sorry' to mean what it
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does is what plays a constitutive role in determining the conditions for suchcorrectness. In other words, the normative constraints range over, more generally,whether one can achieve what one sought to, in using some fragment of the languagein the way that one did, in the circumstances in question.
Thus, what the Travis examples can help us understand, and thus the kind of'contextualism' that is required, is that the correctness of, for example, thedescription of the leaves as green is dependent on what matters about how theleaves are described. There are rules, under the current proposal, that must befollowed if that is to be achieved, and what these rules require is, in part, constitutedby what the relevant terms mean. That is why truth cannot play the role ofcorrectness across the board, because the same goes for the kinds of speech acts thatdo not aim at truth (such as the 'sorry' or 'hurrah' cases). If it were only truth, orupon whatever the correctness of the occurance of some other speech acts depends,then the relevant normative force would be correctly analysed in terms ofhypothetical imperatives.
But, we can now make a distinction between the satisfaction of the criterion as setout in N'' and the hypothetical imperatives which might govern what the practice oflanguage use, in general, can be employed for – the ends that such a practice mayserve. The kinds of hypothetical imperatives that the non-Normativist will appeal towill never tell the full story. That is to say that the criterion of correctness for
particular utterances – of, for example, the statements made with a sentence – willbe that correctness that is relevant to the satisfaction of some hypotheticalimperative which is in play with regards to the reasons for which the statement wasmade in that context. The point can be made in terms of detachability – or rather,why considerations about detachability fail to capture the issue at hand. Remember,it was crucial for the non-Normativist arguments that that normative force involvedin claims about meaning not allow for the consequent of the conditional as itfeatures in a hypothetical imperative to be detached, even if the antecedent weresatisfied. If it could, then the normative force would not be dependent on thepsychological state of the language user in the way it would need to be to falsify theNormativity Thesis.
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But that argument, under this proposal, forgets the main point of the claim thatmeaning is normative: one may have no reason to f (say, describe the colour of theleaves), but, so describing them is constituted by following the rules of describing inthe circumstance. There are certain actions that can be performed by way of the useof some words or sentence in a circumstance, and there are certain actions thatcannot. What the claim that meaning is intrinsically normative comes to here is thatmeaning sets the conditions under which those kinds of actions can be performed inthe various circumstances. That is intrinsic normativity because what semanticconstructions ought to be used to achieve what ends is constrained by the facts ofmeaning (what the rules governing the use of those constructions require). That iswhy the kinds of hypothetical imperatives that Hattiangadi et al. appeal to are notnorms of meaning, but norms that can only be derived given the normativeconstraints in play according to what meaning allows (what the facts of meaningare). These kinds of hypothetical imperatives are thus dependent on the intrinsicnorms of meaning.
In sum, the 'facts of meaning' will be thus understood with reference to the role
words play the L-practice; a 'fact of meaning' is just what a rule that is constitutive
of that practice requires. The Normativity Thesis insisted that facts of meaning
were (at least in part) normative facts. Thus, a claim about a fact of meaning
should immediately imply some normative claim. Considered as the rules
governing a practice, this is easily achieved. For if a 'fact of meaning' is nothing
more than just what a constitutive rule of the practice of language use requires,
then, ex hypothesi a fact of meaning has normative import.17
The idea, then, is that if we understand the facts of meaning as the rules governinguse that are constitutive of the practice of language use, then the claim about 'usingan expression is accordance with its meaning' translates to using an expression inaccordance with the rules governing the use of an expression. Such rules wereunderstood as specifying the conditions for correct application under Millar's
17It should also be clear that Hattiangadi's original objection to MN that it was unable to account forcertain intuitions extracted from specific examples of language use cannot be brought against the'Austinian' MN, because this allows for variation in what words are able to say on occasions so long assuch uses are legitimate moves in the practice of language use.
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proposal. I reject that in favour of the conditions for correct use as here understood,so as to ensure that the norms so associated with such correctness cannot be felt tobe only normative requirements and thus supporting the non-Normativist claim thatthe norms of meaning are hypothetical imperatives (thereby not intrinsic tomeaning). Accordingly, the global instrumental value of semantic correctness can bemade compatible with the claim that they are intrinsic to meaning. For, though it isinstrumental, it is so in the sense that the satisfaction of any constitutive norms of apractice is instrumental to what end the practice is engaged in in the first place. Butthat does not make the norms of meaning hypothetical imperatives in the sense thatfalsifies the claim of the intrinsic normativity of meaning.
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Conclusion
What I have outlined above is a proposal. It is a proposal that is predicated on somevery substantive and controversial conceptions of, in particular, the nature of truth.One may, for example, want to reject it on the grounds that one is convinced byStrawson's argument against what he feels to be Austin's version of thecorrespondence theory, and given the proposal assumes it, it is faulty. Maybe, maybenot. In any case, I suggest that it is not on non-Normativist grounds that the proposalcan be rejected. It is one way that one may go in order to sidestep such issues theyraise, and retain at least some semblance of the Normativity Thesis.
Chiefly, I was concerned to make it the case that the accusation that the only kind ofnormative commitments that we are under when we use language are those of thekind that are the normative requirements of hypothetical imperatives could not bebrought to bear against the proposal. I take it that I have achieved that. For, though itallows for semantic correctness to be instrumental in so far as the global practice oflanguage use is, within that practice, semantic correctness is of intrinsic value to thepractice being carried out at all – indeed, to there being any such practice. Any suchhypothetical imperatives are thus dependent on these norms being satisfied. Sounderstood, meaning is intrinsically normative.
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